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1.

SUMMARY:

Petr contends:

Timely

(1) that the Michigan Supreme

Court erred in holding that protective searches, commonly known
as Terry searches, are limited to pat-down searches of people,
and (2) that marijuana seized from the trunk of resp's car was
properly seized pursuant to an inventory search.
2.

FACTS & DECISION BELOW:

Resp was convicted of

1

-2-

admissibility of certain evidence introduced against defendant
over his objection at trial.
are as follows.

The facts relating to the search
'-----"?

One night two deputies spotted resp driving at

an excessive speed.

The deputies saw the car proceed down a side

road and then swerve, coming to a stop in a ditch.
approached the car.
car.
it.

The deputies

Resp met the deputies at the back of his

Resp produced his license only after being asked twice for
The deputy then asked to see resp's vehicle registration.

When the defendant did not respond, the officer repeated his
request, whereupon resp began walking toward the open door of his
car.

The deputies followed.

door, they saw
car.

As the deputies approached the open

a~nife on the floor of the driver's side of the

The deputies told resp to stop and to put his hands on the

roof of the car.

He did.

One deputy retrieved the knife and the

v

other conducted a pat-down search, which revealed no weapons.

Al.. ~.I"W.- (?.)

One deputy then shined~ hi ~ flashlight into the front seat of the
_J~

car to search for other weapons, petn. at 15, and saw something

~~ leather

~

under the armrest.

Upon lifting the armrest, he observed

a substance he believed to be marijuana.
arrested.

Jl

Resp was thereupon

,,

The deputies then impounded the car.

After determining that

there wasVno lock on the car trunk, one of the deputies, using a
knife, unlatched the trunk.

The deputy later testified that he

opened the trunk "because • • • there may have been more
[marijuana] in the trunk," and because he wanted to check the
trunk for valuables.

More marijuana was found in the trunk.

-3-

Resp moved to suppress all of the marijuana at the
preliminary hearing and several times at trial.
denied all such motions.

The trial court

The Mich. Ct. of App. affirmed resp's

conviction.
The Mich. Sup. Ct. reversed, with one justice dissenting and
one concurring in the result.

It held as follows.

"The

officer's entry into the vehicle cannot be justified under the
principles set forth in Terry.

Terry authorized only a limited

pat-down search of a person suspected of criminal activity.
case did not authorize the search of an area."

That

Moreover,

protection of €he officers, the rationale of Terry, could not
justify this search because "[a]ny weapon which might have been
hidden in the car would have been out of reach of the fresp] and
thus not a danger to the deputies."

Having invalidated the

initial intrusion, the majority quickly found that the marijuana
taken from the trunk must be suppressed as a fruit of the initial
illegal intrusion.
Agreeing that the principles of Terry governed, the
dissenter noted that other courts had upheld protective searches
~----~,

of the interior of a vehicle while the occupants were detained
outside.

These courts reasoned that officers in such encounters

might be in danger because the accosted individuals were not
under arrest at the time and could have returned to the vehicle
and retrieved a weapon when the encounter with the officers
ended.

In this case, the officers faced greater danger because

the defendant had an opportunity to enter the vehicle during his
encounter with the deputies.

Moreover, the danger to the

-4-

deputies clearly outweighed the minimal intrusion upon resp's
privacy that the raising of the armrest represented.

Indeed, the

intrusion made by the officers in this case was minimal compared
to the intrusion upheld in Terry.

The dissenter then asserted

that the seizure of the marijuana in the trunk resulted from a
proper inventory search.
The concurring justice concluded that the marijuana
discovered on the front seat had been obtained legally, for the
reasons stated in the dissent, but believed that the marijuana in
the trunk had been obtained unlawfully.
was not a proper inventory.

The search of the trunk

No standard departmental policy was

followed in conducting the alleged inventory, and no inventory
form was presented below.

The owner of the car was present,

unlike the owner of the car in South Dakota v. Opperman, yet the
police did not ask the owner whether he wanted the car
inventoried.

Also, unlike Opperman, the impoundment lot to which

resp's car would be taken was secure.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petitioner.

The lower courts have split
I (.

on the question of .._._----._
whether a Terry

s ~ ch

may be made of an area

if such a search is necessary to protect a law enforcement
off} cer.

~tive

The Mich. Sup. Ct.'s- decision conflicts with Terry's
frisk rationale.

The marijuana found in the trunk was

the result of a valid inventory search.

The state's caretaking

duty, which provided a justification for the search, arose when
it became clear that the driver could not himself drive the car.
Respondent.
~~

The limitation of the protective search to

defendant's person rested on an interpretation of the Michigan

-5-

Constitution, and thus rests on an adequate state ground
independent of the Fourth Amendment.

The decision below also was

based upon the application of well-established legal principles
to the unique facts of the case.

The court below concluded that

the officers had no reason to believe that resp was armed or
dangerous and that the search was motivated by a desire to
protect themselves.
different result.

None of the cases cited by petr require a
Discussion of whether the trunk search could

be justified as an inventory search was unnecessary to the
decision of the majority, and was only seriously discussed in the
concurring opinion.

Reviewing a concurring opinion in a Mich.

Sup. Ct. case on a point not reached by the majority would be a
waste of this Court's resources.

Moreover, there was no basis _in

Michigan law for jmpounding the car, thus there was no legal
justification for the alleged inventory.

In any event, the

search of the trunk was not a valid inventory search.
4.

DISCUSSION:

There does not seem to be a conflict in the

circuits over this question.

Petr cites only one case that holds

that a Terry search cannot include the search of an area.
However, in this case, Canal Zone v. Bender, 573 F.2d 1329 (5th
Cir. 1978), the CA 5 held that the search was not motivated by
the officer's concern for their safety because the officers did
not frisk the defendants.
The decision

7

('--

belo~oes

conflict with cases in which area

Terry searches have been held consistent with the Fourth
Amendment.

The holding below can fairly be said to rest on

federal grounds.

The court below did explicitly hold that the

-6-

search violated both the state and federal constitutions.

It is

fairly clear, however, that the Mich. Sup. Ct. believed that the
scope of a Terry search under the state constitution was
identical to the scope of such a se: rch under
Constitution.

t~deral

The court was not attempting to give the Michigan

Constitution independent scope.

The court relied not on its own

precedent but on federal precedent.

The decision below does not

rest on a factual finding that the deputies' search was not
motivated by their concern for their own safety.

The Mich. Sup.

Ct. did say that the protective rationale of Terry was
inapplicable because resp could have posed no danger to the
deputies.

However, that statement was an alternative holding and

seems completely wrong.
(

The conflict the opinion below creates is not severe enough

~

to demand the Court's attention at this time.
With respect to the trunk search issue, petr has shown no
need for the Court to discuss the inventory exception in the
context of this case.
I recommend denial.
There is a response.
September 27, 1982
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This is a pre-bench memo identification of the
issues

and

arguments

in

this case

that

is described as

whether the rationale of a Terry stop may be extended to
an "area" here within a automobile - as contrasted with a
weapons frisk of a person's clothing.
Tow officers observed respondent's car, shortly
after midnight, driving at an excessive speech and ending
up in the ditch.

Respondent was out of the vehicle when

the officers requested drivers license and registration.
Respondent had left his door open,

and when he moved to

reenter the car an officer observed a large knife lying of
the floor board.
a

flash

vehicle.

This prompted a pat down (negative), and

light examination of the

front seat area of the

An object was observed beneath the arm rest that

possibly could have a contained a weapon.
it contained marijuana.
automobile,

and

opened

When examined,

The officers then "impounded" the
the

unlocked

trunk

and

found

marijuana in it.
Several

important facts are not disputed:

the

state makes no claim to probable cause either to search
the vehicle before discovering the knife or to arrest for

2.

what appear

to be only a

Respondent

traffic violation.

does not deny that the stop of the vehicle was lawful.
Michigan Supreme Court (reversed respondent's conviction)
The

Court

did

not

question

the

pat

down

of

respondent's person.

This clearly was justified after the

knife was observed.

The court held,

"authorized only
suspected

of

a

however,

that Terry

limited pat down search of a

criminal

activity.

That

case

person

did

not

authorize the search of an area."
The court added that any weapon which might have
been hidden in the car, would have been out of the reach
of respondent and thus no danger to the officers.
The court
trunk

was

an

further

illegal

fruit

held
of

that the search of the
the

search of

the

front

seat, and could not be justified as an inventory search.
New
footnote,

was

York

v.

Belton,

referred

had

not

only

in

a

irrelevant because defendant had not been

arrested prior to the search of the
(Ross

to

been decided

by us,

interior of the car
but

it would not be

applicable because there was not probable cause to search
the automobile).

The SG's Brief (better than that of the state)

,.

The rationale of Terry applies to the "limited
inspection"

of

the

front

seat.

In

view of

defendant's

conduct, and the discovery of a weapon on the floor,

the

police acted reasonably in inspecting the front seat for
other weapons.

The Michigan court said that any weapons

there would not have been a threat to the officers.
the officers were confronted by a dilemma.
sure

there

was

probable

cause

to

But

They were not
Unless

arrest.

they

arrested, the suspect would reenter the vehicle where the
presence of a gun, for example, would constitute a danger.
The SG argues persuasively that officers have to
make "on the scene judgments".

Not infrequently, they are

shot in the course of dealing with suspects.

Given the

options, they acted reasonably in this case and the Terry
doctrine should apply.
Moreover, a motorist's expectation of privacy as
to what can be observed or found by a limited search of
the

interior

{particularly

the

front

seat

of

an

automobile) is minimal.
The

SG also argues

that

York v. Belton should be applied.
the

entire

interior

of a car,

the

principle of New

If officers may search

incident to arrest,

even

when the arrestee has been removed from the car, officers

4.

such

as

those

in

this

case

-

should

be

allowed

the

conduct a limited Terry search for weapons when they have
reasonable suspicion to believe that the suspect was armed
and

dangerous.

fact,

as

to

Courts

should

alternative

not

measures

speculate,
that

after

might

have

the
been

taken.
Search of Trunk
The SG's argument with respect to this aspect of
the

case

is

arrested

less

convincing.

respondent

marijuana,
custody.

and

after

purported

Apparently,

they
to

found

take

the

the

the
car

officers

knife
itself

and
into

Yet, the state does not rely on search incident

to arrest.

Rather, it relies only on the right to make an

inventory search, citing Opperman.
As both the marijuana
the

front

seat

were admit ted

have to decide both issues.

from the trunk and from

in evidence,

I

suppose we

If, however, we agreed with

the state as to the front seat inspection, we could remand
to

the

Michigan

court

to

determine

in

light

of

our

opinion - whether search of the trunk was justified.
I would prefer, however, to go ahead and address
the

search

of

the

trunk

issue.

The SG recognizes

that

Opperman does not control because this was not a regular

5.

departmental type inventory procedure.

But other aspects

of Opperman do support the inventory search justification.
In Opperman, a locked passenger compartment, including an
unlocked glove compartment, were searched.
unlocked trunk was searched.
less

than

where

Opperman.

the

Here, only an

Expectations of privacy were

entire

vehicle

was

locked

as

in

In any event, a search on the scene is no more

intrusive,

and

may

be

more

effective

in

forestalling

claims of theft, than a subsequent search.

* * *
My

tentative

view

is

that

the

inspection

(search} of the front seat area was fully justified by the
circumstances.

This

warrant

where

clause,

may

be

reasonable

officers to protect themselves.
rationale

of

Terry

another

and

in

exception

suspicion

to

the

entitled

the

This, of course,

general

is

supported

is the
by

the

rationale of Belton.
I

am less persuaded as to the validity of the

trunk search.

SG.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

On balance, I am inclined to agree with the
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--....___

automobile,

and

opened

the
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trunk

and
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marijuana in it.
Several

important facts are not disputed:

the

state makes no claim to probable cause either to search
the knife or to arrest for
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f
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v ~hat

appear

to be only a

traffic violation.

Respondent

does not deny that the stop of the vehicle was lawful.
Michigan Supreme Court (reversed respondent's conviction)
The

Court

did

not
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the

pat

down

of

respondent's person.

This clearly was justified after the

knife was observed.

The court held,

"authorized only
suspected

of
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.
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that Terry

limited pat down search of a
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_...
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not
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been hidden in the car, would have been out of the reach
of respondent and thus no danger to the officers.
The court
trunk
..--......,....

was
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further
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front
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to the search of the
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been decided

not
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not be
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front

seat.

In

~ iew

of
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conduct, and the discovery of a weapon on the floor,

the

police acted reasonably in inspecting the front seat for
other weapons.

The Michigan court said that any weapons

there would not have been a threat to the officers.
the officers were confronted by a dilemma.
sure

there

was

probable

cause

to
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They were not

arrest.

Unless
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arrested, the suspect would reenter the vehicle where the
presence of a gun, for example, would constitute a danger.
The SG argues persuasively that officers have to
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Not infrequently, they are
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options, they acted reasonably in this case and the Terry
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to what can be observed or found by a limited search of
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interior
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York v. Belton should be applied.
entire

seat
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the
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interior of a
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the principle of New
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incident
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even
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be

allowed

the
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alternative

not
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after
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taken.
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the
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Rather, it relies only on the right to make an
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have to decide both issues.

from the trunk and from
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suppose we

If, however, we agreed with
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

February 22, 1983

From: Rives

No. 82-256, Michigan v. Long

Questions Presented

1.

Whether Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967), authorizes a

search of the interior of a car when the driver is standing
outside of the car; and

l.

2.

Even if the search of the car interior were not justified,

whether the police may search the trunk of the car pursuant to
an inventory search.

I.

Background
Shortly after midnight, Deputies Howell and Lewis

were on routine road patrol in an unpopulated, rural area in
Michigan.

A car going the opposite direction drove past at

approximately 71 miles per hour.

The officers turned their car

around and pursued the speeding car.

The car maae a left turn,

swerving off the road and running into the ditch.
As the deputies approached, resp who was the only
occupant of the car, got out, left the door on the driver's
side open and met the deputies at the rear of the car.
asked resp for his driver's license.

Howell

Resp did not say anything

and when Howell asked for the license a second time, resp
produced it.

Howell then asked for the car registration and

proof of insurance.

Again, resp did not say anything.

The

request was repeated and resp began walking towards the open
car door.

Both deputies accompanied resp.

Howell testified

that resp was cooperative, that he "appeared to be under the
influence of something," and that he acted scared.

According

to Howell, resp's demeanor was different than that of people
who are nervous because they have been stopped hy a police
officer.

His demeanor instead was more typical of people who

"have open intox in the car or something like that."

App. 25a.

As they approached the open door, the deputies saw a closed

3.

buck knife--a folding knife with a four inch blade--lying on
the front floorboard.

On seeing the knife, they had resp place

his hands on the roof of the car while they frisked him.
frisk produced no weapons.

------

The

After the frisk resp was standing

at the rear of the car under the control of Lewis.

Howell, who

was positioned between resp and the car door, determined that
it was necessary to search the car to see if there were any
weapons in the car.
Deputy Howell testified:
"Okay, after I frisked him I walked up to the door of
the car looking for another weapon.
I shined my
light into the car. There were arm rests--front seat
of the vehicle was equipped with arm rests.
I saw
something that appeared to be under the arm rest. At
this time I kneeled in the vehicle and I lifted the
arm rest. There was a leather pouch, it appeared to
be a long ~ed wallet, folded in half, it wasn't
what you would call a wallet but it appeared
something like that.
It was laying underneath the
arm rest.
Lifting the armrest revealed that the leather pouch, which was
open, contained a plastic bag full of marijuana.

The plastic

bag protruded from the open pouch.
The officers arrested resp for possession of
marijuana.

They searched the interior of the car for further

contraband, but did not find any.
car and asked for the keys.

They decided to impound the

When resp handed over only one

key, Howell asked resp for the trunk key, which resp said he
did not have.

Howell noticed that the trunk lock had been

knocked out and used his own pocket knife to open the trunk.
His reasons for searching the trunk were:"[n]umber one, because
I already found marijuana, suspected marijuana, in the interior

of the car, there may have been more in the trunk.
check them for valuables, I do."

App. 17a.

Secondly, I

A search of the

trunk revealed two bags full of 75 pounds of marijuana.
The trial court refused to suppress the evidence.
The intermediate appellate court found that the search of the
car interior was constitutional under Terry and that the search
of the trunk was a valid inventory search under South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
reversed.

The ~ate

supreme court

It noted first that Terry had authorized only a pat-

down search of a person.
area adjacent to him.

It had not authorized a search of the

Alternatively, the court observed that

the scope of a Terry search must be limited to the reasons for
making the search.

Here the search exceeded its reason--to

provide the officers with protection.

In this case, resp was

outside of the car, under control of one of the officers, and
in no position to reach inside the car.

Because the resp could

not get to the whatever weapons might be in the car, there was
no need for the officers to search the car.
The court also suppressed the marijuana that was
found in the car trunk.

It noted the state's argument that the

search of the trunk was valid either as an inventory search or
a search incident to an arrest.

The court found, however, that

the search of the car trunk was based on the discovery of the
bag of marijuana in the car interior.

As such it was a fruit

of an unlawful search and should be suppressed.

Although the

court did not discuss why it rejected the state's inventory
search argument, it may have concluded that the officer's

dominant motive for searching the trunk was the discovery of
marijuana in the car interior and that the inventory rationale
did not provide an independent basis for the search.

II.

Discussion
This case presents three issues.

First, whether the

decision below rests on independent and adequate state grounds.
Second, whether the search of the car interior was reasonable
in light of the intrusiveness of the search and the reasons for
the police action.

Third, whether the search of the car trunk

was a valid inventory search.

A.

Whether There Are Adequate and Independent State Grounds
The state supreme court stated that the issue

presented was whether the search of the car interior "violated
the constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches
and seizures."

App. to Pet. for Cert. 17.

It defined

"constitutional" as referring to both the United States and the
State Constitutions.
~

See id., at 17, n. 4.

Although the state

supreme court based its subsequent discussion almost
exclusively on Terry and other federal precedent, it held that
the search of the car interior violated both the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and art 1, §11 of
the Michigan Constitution, the state analogue of the Fourth
Amendment.

See id., at 19.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), found that

invocation of state constitutional grounds was not sufficient

o.
when the construction given the state constitutional provision
was predicated on the interpretation of the analagous federal
provision.

If one looked only at the decision below, it would

seem that the analysis in Prouse is applicable here.

The state

supreme court relied primarily on the federal constitutional
standard established in Terry.

As in Prouse, it noted in

concluding that both the state and federal constitutions were
violated.

-

In the same month, however, in which the state court

,.

issued this case, it issued People v. Secrest, 413 Mich. 521

_________......

(1982).

In Secrest, the court stated:

"There are differences in wording between the two
[the Fourth Amendment and the analogous state
provision]. As a result, we have imposed a higher
s~andard under the state prov1s1Qn than the federal
when the~em seized Is not one within the proviso of
the third sentence of art 1, §11. People v. Moore,
391 Mich 426, 216 NW2d 770 (1974); People v. Beavers,
393 Mich 554, 567-568, 227 NW2d 511 (1975).
In doing
so, however, we have in the past looked to federal
case authority in our analysis of the state
constitutional question, and we do so here."
Secrest indicates that the Michigan courts look to federal law
for guidance but do not feel compelled to adopt the federal
interpretation.

Because there is substantial evidence that the

state court was relying

would

recommend that the case

A remand would be

consistent with your vot

stage.

The cert pool

memo indicates that you voted to deny in part because it was
unclear whether the decision rested on state or federal
grounds.

B.

Whether the Search of the Car Interior Was Reasonable

I

7.

The state supreme court found the search here invalid
for two reasons.

First, Terry authorized only a limited pat-

down search of a person.
area.

It did not authorize search of an

Second, given the facts of this case, the search was not

necessary to protect the officer's safety.
The first rationale advanced by the state supreme
court does not seem consistent with Terry v. Ohio.

In Terry,

the Court recognized that a search "must be limited to what is
necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to
harm the officer or others nearby."

Id., at 26.

Although only

a pat-down search was necessary in Terry to ensure the
officer's safety, Terry suggests that the scope of the search
will vary depending on the particular facts of each case.

-

Thus, if a broader search of the area within the supect's

---------~-----------~-----------------immediate reach were necessary, it would seem that Terry would
authorize it.
The more difficult question is whether the scope of
the search undertaken here was reasonable in light of the
circumstances of this case.
446 U.S. 544, 561 (1980)

In United States v. Mendenhall,

(POWELL, J., concurring), you noted

that three factors were relevant to making this determination:
(i) the public interest served by the search;

(ii) the nature

and scope of the intrusion; and (iii) the objective facts upon
which the law enforcement officer relied in light of his
knowledge and expertise.

There can be little doubt but that

there is a strong public interest in ensuring the safety of
policemen.

Traffic stops present a particular problem since

~

o.

the police are forced to approach the offender's car and expose
themselves to unknown risks.

u.s.

106 (1977).

See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434

On the other hand, a search of a suspect's

car is an intrusive measure.

Despite the lesser expectation of

,

privacy in cars than in homes, a person retains a substantial
expectation of privacy in his car.

People traditionally carry

personal effects in their cars and ensure their privacy by
locking and securing their cars against other people's
intrusion.

While the nature of the intrusion--searching the

car--was fairly great, the scope of the search was relatively
limited in this instance.

Deputy Howell only directed his

flashlight into the car and lifted the armrest to get a better
view of the leather pouch underneath.
The third factor is more problematic: whether the
police have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
suspect is armed and dangerous.
suspicion is minimal.

Here, the basis of that

When the police approached initially,

resp got out of the car and carne to meet them.

The police did

not indicate that he gave any sign of being dangerous.

They

described him instead as cooperative, but intoxicated.

Deputy

Howell testified that, in his professional opinion, resp acted
scared as if he had some "open intox" in the car.

The onlv

reason to suppose that resp was an "armed and dangerous
individual" carne from the discovery of the closed buck knife on
the front floorboard of the car.

As Deputy Howell later

testified, there were a number of tools behind the front seat.
This knife easily could have slid forward when the car went

~

~~

Y.

into the ditch.

Although a buck knife is larger than a normal

pocket knife, it is not uncommon for it to be used as a tool or
for hunting.

Given resp's intoxicated, but otherwise innocuous

conduct, the discovery of a buck knife on the floorboard of a
car does not provide a particularly strong inference that resp
presented a danger to the police.
Although the discovery of the knife was the only

I

basis for the police's search, it seems sufficient when
considered in light of this Court's precedents.

In

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, supra, the Court approved a pat-down
search of a motorist when the officer only saw a bulge in the
driver's pocket.

If observation of a bulge is sufficient to

justify a patdown, then it would seem that discovery of a
large, closed knife on the front floorboard is sufficient to
justify some sort of search of the car to determine if there
were other weapons present.
The state supreme court, relying on Chimel, found
that the search should not extend beyond the area that was
within resp's immediate reach, since no greater search was
necessary to protect the officer's safety.

While the state

supreme court's reasoning has a certain appeal, it is
questionable whether it applied Chimel correctly.

In Chimel,

the suspect had been arrested and was under the officer's
control.

Because the arrest restricted the defendant's

mobility in Chimel, there was only a need to search the area in
his immediate control.

Here, the resp was not under arrest and

retained a greater degree of mobility.

He may reenter the car,

10.

as he did here, to get papers or documents.

He definitely will

reenter the car after the police have finished talking to him.
Thus, the area that is within the supect's control is
potentially greater than it is where an arrest has taken place.
When the police have reason to believe that there may be
weapons in the car, as they did here, then it would seem that
the limited search that occurred here is not prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment.
While the search in this case did not entail a
substantial invasion of resp's privacy, I doubt that the
principle that justifies this search can be limited easily.

To

ensure that there are no weapons that a suspect could use on
reentering his car, an officer typically would have to look in
the glove compartment, under the seat and examine any closed
containers.

If the closed container is soft, such as a leather

pouch, an officer can satisfy his concern for safety solely by
"patting down" the pouch.

If, however, there is a closed box

sitting on the seat, only a search of the box itself will
reveal whether it contains dangerous weapons.

Extending a

protective search this far would mean that an articulable
suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous most likely
will entitle an officer to conduct as extensive a search of the
car interior as he could if he had probable cause to arrest the
suspect.

B.

Whether the Search of the Trunk Was Valid

After discovering the marijuana, the deputies
arrested resp and searched the interior of the car, as
permitted by New York v. Belton, 453

u.s.

454 (1981).

They

discovered no contraband other than the plastic bag full of
marijuana.

They then opened the trunk and discovered the two

bags with 75 pounds of marijuana in them.

The question

presented in the cert petn was whether this search may be
justified as a valid inv ~tory search. 1
This case is ){istinguished from South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428

u.s.

364 (1976), in which there was an

established departmental procedure for conducting an inventory
search.

Although Deputy Howell stated that he normally

conducted an inventory search before he impounded a car, he was
only policeman in the department who did this.

There was no

department policy of conducting inventory searches or
procedures to regularize the search itself.

Thus, the search

here is contrary to your concurrence in Opperman, which relied
on the presence of "established police department rules or
policy" that are applicable "whenever an automobile is seized."

1 Although the issue is not presented by the cert petn, the SG
notes that the search of the trunk may be justified as a search
incident to an arrest. Belton, however, explicitly limits such
searches to the interior of the car. The SG also argues that the
discovery of the bag of marijuana in the passenger compartment
gave the police probable cause to search the trunk. This
argument is closer, but questionable.
It is common for a large
number of people to carry small quantities of marijuana in
plastic bags for their own use.
It is questionable whether
carrying such a bag of marijuana makes it probable that larger
quantities of the drug are secreted in the trunk.

See 428

u.s.,

at 383.

In the absence of rules that regularize

such searches the bases for the declaring the search reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment are diminished.
This case is distinguished from Opperman also by the
fact that the suspect was present when the car was impounded.
In Opperman, the car had been left unattended and the police
could not locate him in a reasonable time.
(POWELL, J., concurring).

See id., at 384

Here, the suspect was present.

Because he could have consented to impoundment without an
inventory search, and waived any right to complain if his
valuables were stolen, the concerns that give rise to a need
for an inventory search are lessened.

Conclusion

1.

The question as to whether there are independent and

adequate state grounds is close.

The state court explicitly

relied on the state constitution and subsequently stated that
it only looked to the federal constitutional decisions for
guidance.

Because of the closeness of the issue, I would

recommend Krivda'ing the case.

2.

If you reach the merits, I would recommend reversing the

decision that the search of the car interior violated the
Fourth Amendment.

On balance, the search of the passenger

compartment was reasonable when the officer's concern for
safety, the limited scope of the search, and the discovery of

.L..).

the knife are considered.

Acceptance of this rationale will

lead most likely to approving a search of the interior of a car
whenever an officer has a reasonable suspicion that the suspect
is armed and dangerous.

3.

I would recommend affirming the decision that the inventory
~

search of the trunk was unreasonable, since the search lacked
the safeguards of an established departmental rules and
procedures.
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March 7, 1983

No. 82-256 Michigan v. Long

Dear Thurgood, Lewis and John:
We four are in dissent in the above.

Will you, Lewis,

be willing to undertake the dissent?
Sincerely,

I

A
...
.t . ~LlL

Justice Marshall
Justice Powell
Justice Stevens

-----

·~

.

March 8, 1983

82-256 Michigan v. Long

Dear Bill:
T will be glad to undertake a dissent.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
lfp/ss
cc:

Justice Marshall
Justice Stevens

drk 03/12/83

To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Rives

Re: No. 82-256, Michigan v. Long

In researching state law, it turned out that this question
was more difficult than was apparent from the parties' briefs.

The

problem arises from the "proviso" to art 1, §11, the relevant
Michigan constitutional provision.

The proviso was added to limit

the operation of the state constitutional provision to the extent it
would prohibit the admission of certain types of evidence from
criminal trials.

Michigan has subsequently realized that this

~ovi s io is _,!._nope r ~t i ve to the
-~~ v~~endment.
The result of this
w- t/
,

H'

~

VV~

~

'~ J

with !;_he Fourth

conflict, however, is that with

respect to items falling within the proviso the Michigan

Fourth Amendment.

Thus, any exclusion of evidence that is covered

by the proviso necessarily presents a federal question.

~ _ uf, J vY -

~- ~ -~

~

1:..__!:_~ nfl ict s

constitution offers no greater protection than that provided by the

~

VV

e xten

.

The question on which this case ultimately turns is

~ whether marijuana is a "narcotic drug" within the meaning of the
proviso.

The state

statute~ne

marijuana as not being a

~;~,~i~ drug, ~~ ~~~ory provisions are not necessarily

~ ~~lling as to the meaning of a constitutional
~~~~sti ~~~o~~~~ted in 1963,

~z:/~r~-1
v~
~/~,v ,/ ~

provision.

When

the state statutes

did define marijuana as a narcotic.

Onder state laws of

constitutional construction, the state statutes existing at the time
the constitutional provision is ratified are strong evidence as to
the meaning of its terms.

The state courts, however, have construed

some constitutional terms to incorporate changes occuring after
ratification and it is not completely clear how the Michigan courts
would treat this question.
The state courts have not addressed this issue
specifically.

Although my research makes me question the strength

of our position, I went ahead and wrote up a draft dissent as
strongly, and fairly, as I could.

It seemed to me that the

strongest line of argument available was to say that this was an
unsettled question of state law.

Even if one might speculate as to

the course the state courts would take, it is not the business of
this Court to interpret a State's constitution for it.
this draft, you may want to reconsider your position.
either position is tenable.

On reading
I think

----

The difference between them is I

believe the degree of certainty that this Court will require before
it assumes that it has jurisdiction and the degree to which this
Court is willing to undertake an independent analysis of state law.

drk 03/12/83

No. 82-256 Michigan v. Long--Preliminary Draft

Today the Court reaches out to decide an issue
of federal constitutional law regardless of the fact that
the state judgment may rest on an independent and adequate
state ground.

In so doing the Court transgresses on basic

principles of federalism.
I

This Court consistently has recognized that it
has no jurisdiciton over state court judgments that rest
on independent and adequate state grounds.
v. Prouse, 440

u.s.

See Delaware

648 {1979): Herb v. Pitcairn, 324

117, 125 {1945): Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296
{1935).

u.s.

u.s.

207

This principle is not merely a technical rule: it

reflects instead this Court's limited power to review

state decisions.

As Justice Jackson, writing for the

Court in Pitcairn, recognized:
"[O]ur power is to correct wrong judgments, not
to revise opinions. We are not permitted to
render an advisory opinion, and if the same
judgment would be rendered by the state court
after we corrected its views of federal laws,
our review would amount to nothing more than an
advisory opinion." 324 u.s., at 126.

In order to protect both the States' and our own
jurisdiction, we have required that it affirmatively
appear that the federal question was decided and that its
decision was essential to the disposition of the case.
See, e.g., Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309
555 (1940); Lynch v. New York, 293

u.s.

u.s.

52 (1934).

551,
When

it is not clear whether the decision rests on federal or
state grounds, the Court has either dismissed the writ or
requested the state court to clarify the grounds on which
its judgment rests.

See California v. Krivda, 409 U.S.

33, 35 (1972); Mental Hygiene Dept. v. Kirchner, 380 U.S.
194, 196-197 (1965); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324

u.s., at 127-

128.
II
In this case, the Supreme Court of Michigan
framed the issue before it as whether the officer's
"warrantless search of the interior of the vehicle, while
the defendant was standing near the rear of the car under
the control of another officer, violated the
constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches
and seizures."

413 Mich. 461, 471 (1982).

The court

expressly identified the applicable "constitutional
proscription" as both the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and art 1, §11, the analagous
provision in the Michigan Constitution. 1

See id., at 471,

Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages.

n. 4.

After analyzing the issue in light of our opinion

in Terry v. Ohio, 392

u.s.

1 (1968), the Supreme Court of

Michigan concluded, "We hold, therefore, that the
deputies' search of the vehicle was proscribed by the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art
1, §11 of the Michigan Constitution.

The evidence

obtained pursuant to the unconstitutional search should
have been suppressed."

Id., at 472-473.

1 The language of art. 1, § 11 is similar, but
identical, to the language of the Fourth Amendment.
provides:
"The person, houses, papers, and possessions of
every person shall be secure from unreasonable
searches and seizures. No warrant to search any
place or to seize any person or things shall
issue without describing them,
nor without
probable
cause,
supported
by
oath
or
affirmation.
The provisions of this section
shall not be construed to bar from evidence in
any criminal proceeding any narcotic drug,
firearm, bomb, explosive or any other dangerous
weapon, seized by a peace officer outside the
curtilage of any dwelling house in this state."

f

not
It

When, as here, the state court rests its holding
explicitly on the state constitution, this ordinarily will
be sufficient to establish that the decision is based on
independent and adequate state grounds. 2

In this

instance, however, there is additional evidence that the
Court lacks jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Michigan

repeatedly has interpreted art 1, §11 more broadly than
the Fourth Amendment.

In

~eople

v. Secrest, 321 N.W.2d

368, 369 (1982), for example, it stated:

.AAJ.t~

-(~ ,.,.,.v~

~ween

"There are differences in wording
the
two [provisions]. As a result, we have imposed
a higher standard under the state provision than
2 In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 u.s. 648, 652 (1979), we
held that explicit reliance on a state constitutional
provision would not be sufficient where the opinion makes
clear that the state provision "will automatically be
interpreted"
to
conform
to
the
analogous
federal
provision.
Before
concluding
that
there
were
no
independent state grounds, however, we determined that the
state courts previously had not undertaken any independent
analysis of their own constitution.
See id., at 652 and
nn. 4-5. As noted below in text, Michigan has interpreted
art 1, §11 independently of the Fourth Amendment.

the federal when the item seized is not one
within the proviso of the third sent e nce or art
1, § 11. People v. Moore, 391 Mich. 426, 435,
216 N.W.2d 770 (1974): People v. Beavers, 393
Mich. 554, 567-568, 227 N.W.2d 511 (1975). In
doing so, however, we have in the past looked to
federal case authority in our analysis of the
state constitutional question, and we do so
here."

See also People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 567-568 (1975)
("While the result reached today reflects an analysis of
Federal case authority, our conclusion is based upon the
Michigan Constitution and the protection afforded the
people of this state against unreasonable searches and
seizures): id., at 570 (Coleman, C.J., dissenting)

("We

can, and on occasion do, interpret the state
constitutional provisions as affording protection beyond
those required ••• as a matter of Federal Constitutional
law."): cf. People v. Plantefaber, 410 Mich. 594, 615
(1981)

(Coleman, C.J., dissenting)

(recognizing that state

court has interpreted art 1, §11 more broadly than the
Fourth Amendment).

These cases leave little doubt that,

as a general matter, Michigan courts have interpreted
'"""--•

--·----------~--~

their own constitution independently of the federal and

£--!-have

relied on federal authority only where the analysis

.1\

is persuasive.
This normally would be sufficient to establish

p

~

that the state court's judgment rests on an independent
I

and adequate state ground.

A~~ §~1,

however, contains

a provison that mandates further analysis.

This proviso

states, "The provisions of this section shall not be
construed to bar from evidence in any criminal proceeding
any narcotic drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or any other
dangerous weapon, seized by a peace officer outside the
curtilage of any dwelling house in this state."

"··

Thus,

even if a search otherwise would be unreasonable under art
1, §11, the proviso prevents certain categories of
evidence obtained during the search from being excluded
from criminal trials.
The state constitution of course cannot
authorize the admission of evidence that the federal
constitution would exclude and where there is a conflict
between the two provisions the Michigan courts have
recognized that art 1, §11 is preempted.
Pennington, 383 Mich. 611 (1970) .

See People v.

As the state supreme

court explained, this proviso "precludes a construction of
the Michigan search and seizure clause imposing a higher
standard of reasonableness for searches and seizures of
items named in the provison than the United States Supreme
Court has held applicable under the Fourth Amendment."

~.

See People v. Moore, 391 Mich. 426, 435 (1974).

In other

words, if an item falls within the proviso, the State will
exclude this evidence under art 1, §11 only to the extent
that the Fourth Amendment would require its exclusion.
As the exclusion of any evidence falling within
this proviso necessarily presents a federal question, the

-----------

issue on which our jurisdiction ultimately turns is
whether marijuana is a "narcotic drug" within the meaning
of the proviso.

It is at once apparent that this issue

presents solely a question of state law.

And if this

question is not settled by state decisions, the respect
due the state courts requires that we allow them to decide
in the first instance the scope of their own
constitutional provisions.

~

~ ~J~

~-

An examination of Michigan law reveals that this
issue can hardly be described as settled.

The Supreme

Court of Michigan has never addressed the issue.

The only

Michigan case in which the issue has been presented
squarely did not decide the question but held on other
grounds, "Const 1963, art 1, §11 will no longer allow the
marijuana to be introduced into evidence." 3
Smith, 31 Mich. App. 366, 373 (1971).

People v.

In 1966, one state

appellate court did find that proviso would allow the

3 The analysis in Smith is not clear.
Smith may have
rejected the argument that mar1]uana was a "narcotic drug"
on the basis of the current statutory provision.
If this
were the anaylsis,
then the result today would be
different
since
Michigan
currently
recognizes
that
marijuana is not a narcotic.
See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§333.7107 (1978).
But Smith does not appear to have
resolved this question.
The basis of its holding appears
to be that the Pourth Amendment voided the proviso to art
1, §11--a holding that is in apparent conflict with later
state cases.
Compare People v. Moore, 391 Mich. 427
( 19 7 4) •

l

admission of marijuana.
App. 544 {1966) • 4

See People v. Monroe, 3 Mich.

It did not consider, however, whether

marijuana were a narcotic drug within the meaning of the
state constitution, and the most recent indication of the
State's position suggests otherwise.

v

In People v.

Plantefaber, 410 Mich. 594 {1981), a majority of the state
supreme court found that marijuana uncovered during a
police search should be excluded under both the federal
and state constitutions.

--------------because neither provision,

Chief Justice Coleman dissented
in her view, required that the

4 In People v. Barker, 18 Mich. App. 544 {1969), the
majority did not reach the issue of whether marijuana
seized during a search were admissible under art 1, §11.
Judge Levin, however, reached the issue in a concurring
opinion.
He concluded that the .Fourth Amendment would
require the exclusion of the evidence even though it
otherwise would be admitted under art 1, §11. Judge Levin
did not address specifically the question of whether
mariJUana was a "narcotic drug" but apparently assumed
that it was covered by the proviso.

marijuana be excluded.

In reaching this conclusion, she

determined first that the search complied with the Fourth
Amendment.

She then considered whether art 1, §11

provided Michigan citizens with greater protection than
the Fourth Amendment.

She concluded, "[o]n the facts

herein, I find nothing in Const. 1963, art 1, §11, which
would justify extending the protections of the state
Constitution beyond the protection of US Const, Am IV, so
as to require the exclusion of the challenged evidence."
Id., at

Of course, if marijuana were a narcotic drug

within the meaning of the proviso, there would have been
no need for Chief Justice Coleman to have considered
whether the state constitution extended greater protection
than the Fourth Amendment.

A determination that the

marijuana was admissible under the Fourth Amendment

automatically would have established its admissibility
under the Michigan constitution.

I would hesitate to rest

this Court's jurisdiction on as fragile a base as these
scattered and sporadic decisions provide.
The Michigan statutes do not clarify the matter
either.

v

At present marijuana is not classified as a

narcotic drug.

"Narcotic drug" is defined instead only as

"[o]pium and opiate, and any salt, compound, derivative,
or preparation of opium or opiate."
Ann. §333.7106 (1978).

See Mich. Comp. Laws

v

It is true that when art 1, §11

---

was adopted in 1963, Michigan defined marijuana as a
narcotic drug.
1970).

See 1931 Mich. Pub. Acts 172 (repealed

But it is not clear whether Michigan would

interpret the specific constitutional term in art 1, §11
in light of the statutory definition at the time of

enactment or whether it would choose to interpret its
constitution to reflect the state public policy. 5

While

this Court might speculate on the course Michigan would
take, Michigan has not decided this question, and it is
not the business of this Court to construe a State's
constitution for it.
III

5 Michigan has
recognized
that
"[a]
constitutional
provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted
in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws
and with reference to them."
See Bacon v. Kent-Ottawa
Authority, 354 Mich. 159, 171 {1958). But the state court
has also recognized that the constitutional provisions are
to be interpreted to accomodate changed conditions. See
Lockwood v. Commissioner of Revenue, 357 Mich. 517 {1959).
Accordingly, the state supreme court has interpreted the
constitutional phrase "municipal corporation" to include a
form of municipal organization that was not recognized at
the time the constitutional provision was ratified. See
Charter Township of Warren v. Municipal Finance Com'n, 341
Mich. 6 07 {19 54) .
But it has refused to interpret the
same term, "municipal corporation," in a way that would
defeat its very purpose.
See Kent-Ottawa Authority,
supra, at 172.
Whether the Supreme Court of Michigan
would find that marijuana continues to be a "narcotic
drug" within the meaning of the provisio is particularly a
question of state law and policy .

.

,......

Where it is unclear, as it is here, whether the
judgment below rests on independent and adequate state
grounds, the respect due the States, no less than concerns
for our own jurisdiction, requires that we ask rather than
tell the States what they intended.

Accordingly, I would

vacate the judgment and remand for such further
proceedings as may be appropriate.

'.

'
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), we upheld the validity
of a protective search for weapons in the absence of probable
cause to arrest because it is unreasonable to deny a police officer the right "to neutralize the threat of physical harm," id.,
at 24, when he possesses an articulable suspicion that an individual is armed and dangerous. We did not, however, expressly address whether such a protective search for weapons could extend to an area beyond the person in the absence
of probable cause to arrest. In the present case, respondent
David Long was convicted for possession of marijuana found
by police in the passenger compartment and trunk of the
automobile that he was driving. The police searched the
passenger compartment because they had reason to believe
that the vehicle contained weapons potentially dangerous to
the officers. We hold that the protective search of the passenger compartment was reasonable under the principles
articulated in Terry and other decisions of this Court. We
also examine Long's argument that the decision below rests
upon an adequate and independent state ground, and we decide in favor of our jurisdiction.
I

Deputies Howell and Lewis were on patrol in a rural area
one evening when, shortly after midnight, they observed a
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car traveling erratically and at excessive speed. 1 The officers observed the car turning down a side road, where it
swerved off into a shallow ditch. The officers stopped to investigate. Long, the only occupant of the automobile, met the
deputies at the rear of the car, which was protruding from
the ditch onto the road. The door on the driver's side of the
vehicle was left open.
Deputy Howell requested Long to produce his operator's
license, but he did not respond. After the request was repeated, Long produced his license. Long again failed to respond when Howell requested him to produce the vehicle
registration. After another repeated request, Long, whom
Howell thought "appeared to be under the influence of something," 413 Mich. 461, 469, 320 N. W. 2d 866, 868 (1982),
turned from the officers and began walking toward the open
door of the vehicle. The officers followed Long and both observed a large hunting knife on the floorboard of the driver's
side of the car. The officers then stopped Long's progress
'It is clear, and the respondent concedes, that if the officers had arrested Long for speeding or for driving while intoxicated, they could have
searched the passenger compartment under New York v. Belton, 453 U. S.
454 (1981), and the trunk under United States v. Ross, - - U. S. - (1982), if they had probable cause to believe that the trunk contained contraband. See Tr. Oral Arg., at 41. However, at oral argument, the State
informed us that while Long could have been arrested for a speeding violation under Michigan law, he was not arrested because "[a]s a matter of
practice," police in Michigan do not arrest for speeding violations unless
"more" is involved. See Tr. Oral Arg., at 6. The officers did issue Long
an appearance ticket. The petitioner also confirmed that the officers could
have arrested Long for driving while intoxicated but they "would have to
go through a process to make a determination as to whether the party is
intoxicated and then go from that point." ld., at 6.
The court below treated this case as involving a protective search, and
not a search justified by probable cause to arrest for speeding, driving
while intoxicated, or any other offense. Further, the petitioner does not
argue that if probable cause to arrest exists, but the officers do not actually
effect the arrest, that the police may nevertheless conduct a search as
broad as those authorized by Belton and Ross. Accordingly, we do not
address that issue.
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and subjected him to a Terry protective pat-down, which revealed no weapons.
Long and Deputy Lewis then stood by the rear of the vehicle while Deputy Howell shined his flashlight into the interior
of the vehicle, but did not actually enter it. The purpose of
Howell's action was "to search for other weapons." I d., at
469, 320 N. W. 2d, at 868. The officer noticed that something was protruding from under the armrest on the front
seat. He knelt in the vehicle and lifted the armrest. He
saw an open pouch on the front seat, and upon flashing his
light on the pouch, determined that it contained what appeared to be marijuana. After Deputy Howell showed the
pouch and its contents to Deputy Lewis, Long was arrested
for possession of marijuana. A further search of the interior
of the vehicle, including the glovebox, revealed neither more
contraband nor the vehicle registration. The officers decided to impound the vehicle. Deputy Howell opened the
trunk, which did not have a lock, and discovered inside it approximately 75 pounds of marijuana.
The Barry County Circuit Court denied Long's motion to
suppress the marijuana taken from both the interior of the
car and its trunk. He was subsequently convicted of possession of marijuana. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed
Long's conviction, holding that the search of the passenger
compartment was valid as a protective search under Terry,
supra, and that the search of the trunk was valid as an inventory search under South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364
(1976). See 94 Mich. App. 338, 288 N. W. 2d 629 (1979).
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed. The court held that
"the sole justification of the Terry search, protection of the
police officers and others nearby, cannot justify the search in
this case." 413 Mich., at 472, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869. The
marijuana found in Long's trunk was considered by the court
below to be the "fruit" of the illegal search of the interior, and
was also suppressed. 2
2

Chief Justice Coleman dissented, arguing that Terry authorized the
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We granted certiorari in this case to consider the important question of the authority of a police officer to protect
himself by conducting a Terry-type search of the passenger
compartment of a motor vehicle during the lawful investigatory stop of the occupant of the vehicle. - - U. S. - (1982).
II
Before reaching the merits, we must consider Long's argument that we are without jurisdiction to decide this case because the decision below rests on an adequate and independent state ground. The court below referred twice to the state
constitution in its opinion, but otherwise relied exclusively on
federal law. 3 Long argues that the Michigan courts have
provided greater protection from searches and seizures
under the state constitution than is afforded under the
Fourth Amendment, and the references to the state constitution therefore establish an adequate and independent ground
for the decision below.
It is, of course, "incumbent upon this Court ... to ascertain for itself ... whether the asserted non-federal ground
independently and adequately supports the judgment."
Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765, 773 (1931). Although we have announced a number of principles in order to
help us determine whether various forms of references to
area search, and that the trunk search was a valid inventory search. See
413 Mich., at 473-480, 320 N. W. 2d, at 870-873. Justice Moody concurred in the result on the ground that the trunk search was improper.
He agreed with Chief Justice Coleman that the interior search was proper
under Terry. See id., at 480-486, 320 N. W. 2d, 873-875.
3
On the first occasion, the court merely cited in a footnote both the
state and federal constitutions. See 413 Mich., at 471, n. 4, 320 N. W. 2d,
at 869, n. 4. On the second occasion, at the conclusion of the opinion, the
court stated: "We hold, therefore, that the deputies' search of the vehicle
was proscribed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution." !d., at 472-473, 320
N. W. 2d, at 870.

' I'
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state law constitute adequate and independent state
grounds, 4 we openly admit that we have thus far not developed a satisfying and consistent approach for resolving this
vexing issue. In some instances, we have taken the strict
view that if the ground of decision was at all unclear, we
would dismiss the case. See, e. g., Lynch v. New York, 293
U. S. 52 (1934). In other instances, we have vacated, see,
e. g., Minnesota v. National Tea Co, 309 U. S. 551 (1940), or
continued a case, see e. g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117
(1945), in order to obtain clarification about the nature of a
state court decision. See also California v. Krivda, 409
U. S. 33 (1972). In more recent cases, we have ourselves
examined state law to determine whether state courts have
used federal law to guide their application of state law or to
provide the actual basis for the decision that was reached.
See also Delaware v. Prouse, supra, and Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., supra. In Oregon v.
Kennedy,-- U. S. - - , - - - - - (1982), we rejected an
'For example, we have long recognized that "where the judgment of a
state court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal and the other
non-federal in character, our jurisdiction fails if the non-federal ground is
independent of the federal ground and adequate to support the judgment."
Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U. S. 207, 210 (1935). We may review a
state case decided on a federal ground even if it is clear that there was an
available state ground for decision on which the state court could properly
have relied. Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U. S. 35, 37, n. 3 (1967). Also, if,
in our view, the state court "'felt compelled by what it understood to be
federal constitutional considerations to construe ... its own law in the
manner that it did,'" then we will not treat a normally adequate state
ground as independent, and there will be no question about our jurisdiction. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 653 (1979) (quoting Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 562, 568 (1977)). See also
South Dakota v. Neville, - - U. S. - - , - - , n. 3 (1983). Finally,
"where the non-federal ground is so interwoven with the [federal ground]
as not to be an independent matter, or is not of sufficient breadth to sustain
the judgment without any decision of the other, our jurisdiction is plain."
Enterprise Irrigation District v. Farmers Mutual Canal Company, 243
u. s. 157, 164 (1917).
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invitation to remand to the state court for clarification even
when the decision rested in part on a case from the state
court, because we determined that the state case itself rested
upon federal grounds. We added that "[e]ven if the case admitted of more doubt as to whether federal and state grounds
were intermixed, the fact that the state court relied to the
extent it did on federal grounds requires us to reach the mer"t " fd
t
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0..

-

{I)

(!)

1-4·

::l

1-4· rt" <:
rt" 1-4· 0
J-4• (') ......

<: Ill <:

(!)

......

It>

I

82-256-0PINION
MICHIGAN v. LONG

7

of an alleged state ground is not apparent from the four corners of the opinion. We have long recognized that dismissal
is inappropriate "where there is strong indication ... that
the federal constitution as judicially construed controlled the
decision below." National Tea Co., supra, 309 U. S., at 556
(1940).
Respect for the independence of state courts, as well as
avoidance of rendering advisory opinions, have been the cornerstones of this Court's refusal to decide cases where there
is an adequate and independent state ground. It is precisely
because of this respect for state courts, and this desire to
avoid advisory opinions, that we do not wish to continue to
decide issues of state law that go beyond the opinion that we
review, or to require state courts to reconsider cases to clarify the grounds of their decisions. Accordingly, when, as in
this case, a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law,
and when the adequacy and independence of any possible
state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we
will no longer reject the most reasonable explanation that the
state court decided the case the way it did because it believed
that federal law required it to do so. If a state court chooses
merely to rely on federal precedents as it would on the precedents of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear
by a plain statement in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only for the purpose of guidance,
and do not themselves compel the result that the court has
reached. In this way, both justice and judicial administration
will be greatly improved. If the state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on
bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds, we,
of course, will not undertake to review the decision. This
approach obviates in most instances the need to examine
state law in order to decide the nature of the state court decision, and will at the same time avoid the danger of our rendering advisory opinions. -.1. It also avoids the unsatisfactory

*There may be certain circumstances in which clarification
is necessary or desirable, and we will not be foreclosed from
taking the appropriate action.
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and intrusive practice of requiring state courts to clarify their
decisions to the satisfaction of this Court. We believe that
such an approach will provide state judges with a clearer
opportunity to develop state jurisprudence unimpeded by
federal interference, and yet will preserve the integrity of
federal law. "It is fundamental that state courts be left free
and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions.
But it is equally important that ambiguous or obscure adjudications by state courts do not stand as barriers to a determination by this Court of the validity under the federal constitution of state action." National Tea Co., supra, 309
U. S., at 557.
Our review of the decision below under this framework
leaves us unconvinced that it rests upon an independent state
ground. Apart from its two citations to the state constitution, the court below relied exclusively on its understanding
of Terry and other federal cases. Not a single state case was
cited to support the state court's holding that the search of
the passenger compartment was unconstitutional. 6 Indeed,
the court declared that the search in this case was unconstitutional because "[t]he Court of Appeals erroneously applied
the principles of Terry v. Ohio ... to the search of the interior of the vehicle in this case." 413 Mich., at 471, 320 N. W.
2d, at 869. The references to the state constitution in no
way indicate that the decision below rested on grounds in any
' At oral argument, Long argued that the state court relied on its decision in People v. Reed, 393 Mich. 342, 224 N. W. 2d 867, cert. denied, 422
U. S. 1044 (1975). See Tr. of Oral Arg., at 29. However, the court cited
that case only in the context of a statement that the State did not seek to
justify the search in this case "by reference to other exceptions to the warrant requirement." 413 Mich., at 472, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869-870 (footnote
omitted). The court then noted that Reed held that "A warrantless search
and seizure is unreasonable per se and violates the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and art. 1, § 11 of the state constitution unless shown to be within one of the exceptions to the rule." I d., at 472-473,
n. 8, 320 N. W. 2d, at 870, n. 8.
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way independent from the state court's interpretation of federal law. Even if we accept that the Michigan constitution
has been interpreted to provide independent protection for
certain rights also secured under the Fourth Amendment, it
fairly appears in this case that the Michigan Supreme Court
rested its decision primarily on federal law.
Rather than dismissing the case, or requiring that the
state court reconsider its decision on our behalf solely because of a mere possibility that an adequate and independent
ground supports the judgment, we find that we have jurisdiction in the absence of a plain statement that the decision
below rested on an adequate and independent state ground.
It appears to us that the state court "felt compelled by what
it understood to be federal constitutional considerations to
construe . . . its own law in the manner that it did."
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. 8.
562, 568 (1977). 7
7
There is nothing unfair about requiring a plain statement of an independent state ground in this case. Even if we were to rest our decision on
an evaluation of the state law relevant to Long's claim, as we have sometimes done in the past, our understanding of Michigan law would also result
in our finding that we have jurisdiction to decide this case. Under state
search and seizure law, a "higher standard" is imposed under art. 1, § 11 of
the 1963 Michigan Constitution. See People v. Secrist, 413 Mich. 521, 525,
321 N. W. 2d 368, 369 (1982). If, however, the item seized is, inter alia, a
"narcotic drug . . . seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any
dwelling house in this state," art I, § 11 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution,
then the seizure is governed by a standard identical to that imposed by the
Fourth Amendment. See People v. Moore, 391 Mich. 426, 435, 216 N. W.
2d 770, 775 (1974).
.
Long argues that under the current Michigan Public Health Code
§ 333.7107, the definition of a "narcotic" does not include marijuana. The
difficulty with this argument is that Long fails to cite any authority for the
proposition that the term "narcotic" as used in the Michigan constitution is
dependent on current statutory definitions of that term. Indeed, it appears that just the opposite is true. The Michigan Supreme Court has
held that constitutional provisions are presumed "to be interpreted in accordance with existing laws and legal usages of the time" of the passage of
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III
The court below held, and respondent Long contends, that
Deputy Howell's entry into the vehicle cannot be justified
under the principles set forth in Terry because Terry authorized only a limited pat-down search of a person suspected of
criminal activity rather than a search of an area. 413 Mich.,
at 472, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869 (footnote omitted). Brief for
Respondent, p. 10. Although Terry did involve the protective frisk of a person, we believe that the police action in this
case is justified by the principles that we have already established in Terry and other cases.
In Terry, the Court examined the validity of a "stop and
frisk" in the absence of probable cause and a warrant. The
police officer in Terry detained several suspects to ascertain
their identities after the officer had observed the suspects for
a brief period of time and formed the conclusion that they
the provision. Bacon v. Kent-Ottawa Authority, 354 Mich. 159, 169, 92
N. W. 2d 492, 497 (1958). If the state legislature were able to change the
interpretation of a constitutional provision by statute, then the legislature
would have "the power of outright repeal of a duly-voted constitutional
provision." Ibid.
Applying these principles, the Michigan courts have
held that a statute passed subsequent to the applicable state constitutional
provision is not relevant for interpreting its constitution, and that a definition in a legislative act pertains only to that act. Jones v. City of Ypsilanti, 26 Mich. App. 574, 182 N. W. 2d 795 (1970). See also Walber v.
Wayne Circuit Judge, 2 Mich. App. 145, 138 N. W. 2d 772 (1966), affd, 381
Mich. 138, 160 N. W. 2d 876 (1968). At the time that the 1963 Michigan
Constitution was enacted, it is clear that marijuana was considered a narcotic drug. See 1961 Mich. Pub. Acts, No. 266, § 1. Indeed, it appears
that marijuana was considered a narcotic drug in Michigan until1978, when
it was removed from the narcotic classification.
We would conclude that
the seizure of marijuana in Michigan is not subject to analysis under any
"higher standard" that may be imposed on the seizure of other items. In
the light of our holding in Delaware v. Prouse, supra, that an interpretation of state law in our view compelled by federal constitutional considerations is not an independent state ground, we would have jurisdiction to
decide the case.
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were about to engage in criminal activity. Because the officer feared that the suspects were armed, he patted down the
outside of the suspects' clothing and discovered two revolvers.
Examining the reasonableness of the officer's conduct in
Terry, 8 we held that there is "'no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or
seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails."' 392 U. S., at 21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U. S. 523, 536--537 (1967)). Although the conduct
of the officer in Terry involved a "severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security," 392 U. S., at 24-25,
we found that the conduct was reasonable when we weighed
the interest of the individual against the legitimate interest
in "crime detection and prevention," id., at 23, and the "need
for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other
prospective victims of violence in situations where they lack
probable cause for an arrest." I d., at 24. When the officer
has a reasonable belief "that the individual whose suspicious
behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to
be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take
Although we did not in any way weaken the warrant requirement, we
acknowledged that the typical "stop and frisk" situation involves "an entire
rubric of police conduct-necessarily swift action predicated upon the onthe-spot observations of the officer on the beat-which historically has not
been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure. Instead, the conduct in this case must be tested by the Fourth
Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures." 392 U. S., at 20 (footnote omitted). We have emphasized that
the propriety of a Terry stop and frisk is to be judged according to whether
the officer acted as a "reasonably prudent man" in deciding that the intrusion was justified. Terry, supra, 392 U. S., at 27. "A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most
reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time." Adams
v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 146 (1972).
8
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necessary measures to determine whether the person is in
fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm." Ibid.
Although Terry itself involved the stop and subsequent
pat-down search of a person, we were careful to note that
"[ w]e need not develop at length in this case, however, the
limitations which the Fourth Amendment places upon a protective search and seizure for weapons. These limitations
will have to be developed in the concrete factual circumstances of individual cases." !d. at 29. Contrary to Long's
view, Terry did not restrict the preventative search to the
person of the detained suspect. 9
In two cases in which we applied Terry to specific factual
situations, we recognized that investigative detentions involving suspects in vehicles are especially fraught with danger to police officers. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434
U. S. 106 (1972), we held that police may order persons out of
an automobile during a stop for a traffic violation, and may
frisk those persons for weapons if there is a reasonable belief
that they are armed and dangerous. Our decision rested in
part on the "inordinate risk confronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in an automobile." !d., at 110. In
Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972), we held that the
police, acting on an informant's tip, may reach into the passenger compartment of an automobile to remove a gun from a
driver's waistband even where the gun was not apparent to
police from outside the car and the police knew of its exist9

As Chief Justice Coleman noted in her dissenting opinion in the
present case:
"The opinion in TemJ authorized the frisking of an overcoat worn by defendant because that was the issue presented by the facts. One could reasonably conclude that a different result would not have been constitutionally required if the overcoat had been carried, folded over the forearm,
rather than worn. The constitutional principles in Terry would still
control."
413 Mich., at 475-476, 320 N. W. 2d, at 871 (Coleman, C. J., dissenting).
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ence only because of the tip. Again, our decision rested in
part on our view of the danger presented to police officers in
"traffic stop" and automobile situations. 10
Finally, we have also expressly recognized that suspects
may injure police officers and others by virtue of their access
to weapons, even though they may not themselves be armed.
In the Term following Terry, we decided Chimel v. California, 395 U. 8. 752 (1969), which involved the limitations imposed on police authority to conduct a search incident to a
valid arrest. Relying explicitly on Terry, we held that when
an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to
search "the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control'-construing that phrase to mean the area from
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." I d., at 763. We reasoned that "[a]
gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested
can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed
in the clothing of the person arrested." Ibid. In New York
v. Belton, 453 U. 8. 454 (1981), we determined that the lower
courts "have found no workable definition of 'the area within
the immediate control of the arrestee' when that area arguably includes the interior of an automobile and the arrestee is
its recent occupant." Id., at 460. In order to provide a
"workable rule," ibid., we held that "articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an
automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably,
within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order
to grab a weapon' .... " Ibid. (quoting Chimel, supra, 395
U. 8., at 763). We also held that the police may examine the
contents of any open or closed container found within the pas10
"According to one study, approximately 30% of police shootings occurred when a police officer approached a suspect seated in an automobile.
Bristow, Police Officer Shootings-A Tactical Evaluation, 54
J.Crim.L.C.& P.S. 93 (1963)." Adams v. Williams, supra, 407 U. S., at
148, n. 3.
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senger compartment, "for if the passenger compartment is
within the reach of the arrestee, so will containers in it be
within his reach." 453 U. S., at 460. (footnote omitted).
See also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 702 (1981).
Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and
others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger, that roadside
encounters between police and suspects are especially hazardous, and that danger may arise from the possible presence
of weapons in the area surrounding a suspect. These principles compel our conclusion that the search of the passenger
compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in
which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the
police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on "specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the officers
to believe that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may
gain immediate control of weapons. u See Terry, 392 U. S.,
"We stress that our decision does not mean that the police may conduct
automobile searches whenever they conduct an investigative stop, although
the "bright line" that we drew in Belton clearly authorizes such a search
whenever officers effect a custodial arrest. An additional interest exists
in the arrest context, i. e., preservation of evidence, and this justifies an
"automatic" search. However, that additional interest does not exist in
the Terry context. A Terry search, "unlike a search without a warrant
incident to a lawful arrest, is not justified by any need to prevent the disappearance or destruction of evidence of crime .... The sole justification of
the search ... is the protection of police officers and others nearby .... "
392 U. S., at 29. What we borrow now from Chimel and Belton is merely
the recognition that part of the reason to allow area searches incident to an
arrest is that the arrestee, who may not himself be armed, may be able to
gain access to weapons to injure officers or others nearby, or otherwise to
hinder legitimate police activity. This recognition applies as well in the
Terry context. However, because the interest in collecting and preserving evidence is not present in the Terry context, we require that officers
who conduct area searches during investigative detentions must do so only
when they have the level of suspicion identified in Terry.
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at 21. "The issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in
the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his
safety or those of others was in danger." ld., at 27. If a
suspect is "dangerous," he is no less dangerous simply because he is not arrested. If, while conducting a legitimate
Terry search of the interior of the automobile, the officer
should, as here, discover contraband other than weapons, he
clearly cannot be required to ignore the contraband, and the
Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression in such
circumstances. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443,
465 (1971); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978);
Texas v. Brown,-- U.S.--,--,-- (1983) (plurality
opinion by REHNQUIST, J., and opinion concurring in the
judgment by POWELL, J.).
The circumstances of this case clearly justified Deputies
Howell and Lewis in their reasonable belief that Long posed
a danger if he were permitted to reenter his vehicle. The
hour was late and the area rural. Long was driving his automobile at excessive speed, and his car swerved into a ditch.
The officers had to repeat their questions to Long, who appeared to be "under the influence" of some intoxicant. The
intrusion was "strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which
justifi[ed] its initiation." Terry, supra, 392 U. S., at 26.
Long was not frisked until the officers observed that there
was a large knife in the interior of the car into which Long
was about to reenter. The subsequent search of the car was
restricted to those areas to which Long would generally have
immediate control, and that could contain a weapon. The trial
court determined that the leather pouch containing marijuana could have contained a weapon. App. 64a. 12
"The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all circumstances of the
particular government invasion of a citizen's personal secu12

Of course, our analysis would apply to justify the search of Long's person that was conducted by the officers after the discovery of the knife.
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Pennsylvania v. Mimms, supra, 434 U. S., at
(quoting Terry, supra, 392 U. S., at 19). In this
case, the officers did not act unreasonably in not permitting
Long to reenter his automobile before taking preventive
measures to ensure that there were no other weapons within
Long's immediate grasp. Therefore, the balancing required
by Terry clearly weighs in favor of permitting the police to
conduct an area search to uncover weapons, as long as they
possess an articulable belief that the suspect is potentially
dangerous.
The Michigan Supreme Court appeared to believe that it
was not reasonable for the officers to believe that Long could
injure them, because he was effectively under their control
during the investigative stop and could not get access to any
weapons that might have been located in the automobile. See
413 Mich., at 472, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869. This reasoning is
mistaken in several respects. During any investigative detention, the suspect is "in the control" of the officers in the
sense that he "may be briefly detained against his will . . .. "
Terry, supra, 392 U. S., at 34 (WHITE, J., concurring). Just
as a Terry suspect on the street may, despite being under the
brief control of a police officer, reach into his clothing andretrieve a weapon, so might a Terry suspect in Long's position
break away from police control and retrieve a weapon from
his automobile. See United States v. Rainone, 586 F. 2d
1132, 1134 (CA 7 1978), cert. denied, 440 U. S. 980 (1979). In
addition, if the suspect is not placed under arrest, he will be
permitted to reenter his automobile, and he will then have access to any weapons inside. United States v. Powless, 546
F. 2d 792, 795-796 (CAS), cert. denied, 430 U. S. 910 (1977).
Or, as here, the suspect may be permitted to reenter the vehicle before the Terry investigation is over, and again, may
have access to weapons. In any event, we stress that a
Terry investigation, such as the one that occurred here, involves a police investigation "at close range," Terry, supra,
392 U. S., at 24, when the officer remains particularly vul-

rity."'

10~109
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nerable in part because a full custodial arrest has not been
effected, and the officer must make a "quick decision as to
how to protect himself and others from possible danger."
I d., at 28. In such circumstances, we have not required that
officers adopt alternate means to ensure their safety in order
to avoid the intrusion involved in a Terry encounter. 13
IV
The trial court and the court of appeals upheld the search
of the trunk as a valid inventory search under this Court's decision in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (1976).
The Michigan Supreme Court did not address this holding,
and instead suppressed the marijuana taken from the trunk
as a fruit of the illegal search of the interior of the automobile. Our holding that the initial search was justified under
Terry makes it necessary to determine whether the trunk
search was permissible under the Fourth Amendment.
However, we decline to address this question because it was
not passed upon by the Michigan Supreme Court, whose deci3
' Long makes a number of arguments concerning the invalidity of the
search of the passenger compartment. The thrust of these arguments is
that Terry searches are limited in scope and that an area search is fundamentally inconsistent with this limited scope. We have recognized that
Terry searches are limited insofar as they may not be conducted in the absence of an articulable suspicion that the intrusion is justified, see e. g.,
Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 65 (1968), and that they are protective
in nature and limited to weapons, see Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85,
93-94 (1979). However, neither of these concerns is violated by our decision. To engage in an area search, which is limited to seeking weapons,
the officer must have an articulable suspicion that the suspect is potentially
dangerous.
Long also argues that there cannot be a legitimate Terry search based on
the discovery of the hunting knife because Long possessed that weapon legally. See Brief for Respondent, p. 17. Assuming arguendo that Long
possessed the knife lawfully, we have expressly rejected the view that the
validity of a Terry search depends on whether the weapon is possessed in
accordance with state law. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 146
(1972).
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sion we review in this case. See Cardinale v. Louisiana,
394 U. S. 437, 438 (1969). We remand this issue to the court
below, to enable it to determine whether the trunk search
was permissible under Opperman, supra, or other decisions
of this Court. See, e. g., United States v. Ross, - - U. S.
- - , (1982). 14

v

The decision of the Michigan Supreme Court is reversed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

14

Long suggests that the trunk search is invalid under state law.

See

Tr. of Oral Arg., at 41, 43-44. The Michigan Supreme Court is, of course,
free to determine the validity of that search under state law.
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SUPRElVIE COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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MICHIGAN, PETITIONER v. DAVID KERK LONG
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
MICHIGAN
[May - , 1983]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), we upheld the validity
of a protective search for weapons in the absence of probable
cause to arrest because it is unreasonable to deny a police officer the right "to neutralize the threat of physical harm," id.,
at 24, when he possesses an articulable suspicion that an individual is armed and dangerous. We did not, however, expressly address whether such a protective search for weapons could extend to an area beyond the person in the absence
of probable cause to arrest. In the present case, respondent
David Long was convicted for possession of marijuana found
by police in the passenger compartment and trunk of the
automobile that he was driving. The police searched the
passenger compartment because they had reason to believe
that the vehicle contained weapons potentially dangerous to
the officers. We hold that the protective search of the passenger compartment was reasonable under the principles
articulated in Terry and other decisions of this Court. We
also examine Long's argument that the decision below rests
upon an adequate and independent state ground, and we decide in favor of our jurisdiction.
I

Deputies Howell and Lewis \vere on patrol in a rural area
one evening when, shortly after midnight, they observed a
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car traveling erratically and at excessive speed. 1 The officers observed the car turning down a side road, where it
swerved off into a shallow ditch. The officers stopped to investigate. Long, the only occupant of the automobile, met the
deputies at the rear of the car, which was protruding from
the ditch onto the road. The door on the driver's side of the
vehicle was left open.
Deputy Howell requested Long to produce his operator's
license, but he did not respond. After the request was repeated, Long produced his license. Long again failed torespond when Howell requested him to produce the vehicle
registration. After another repeated request, Long, whom
Howell thought "appeared to be under the influence of something," 413 Mich. 461, 469, 320 N. W. 2d 866, 868 (1982),
turned from the officers and began walking toward the open
door of the vehicle. The officers followed Long and both observed a large hunting knife on the floorboard of the driver's
side of the car. The officers then stopped Long's progress
'It is clear, and the respondent concedes, that if the officers had arrested Long for speeding or for driving while intoxicated, they could have
searched the passenger compartment under N ew York v. Belton , 453 U. S.
454 (1981), and the trunk under United States v. Ross , - - U. S. - (1982), if they had probable cause to believe that the trunk contained contraband. See Tr. Oral Arg., at 41. However, at oral argument, the State
informed us that while Long could have been arrested for a speeding violation under Michigan law, he was not arrested because "[a]s a matter of
practice," police in Michigan do not arrest for speeding violations unless
"more" is involved. See Tr. Oral Arg., at 6. The officers did issue Long
an appearance ticket. The petitioner also confirmed that the officers could
have arrested Long for driving while intoxicated but they "would have to
go through a process to make a determination as to whether the party is
intoxicated and then go from that point." ld. , at 6.
The court below treated this case as involving a protective search, and
not a search justified by probable cause to arrest for speeding, driving
while intoxicated, or any other offense. Further, the petitioner does not
argue that if probable cause to arrest exists, but the officers do not actually
effect the arrest, that the police may nevertheless conduct a search as
broad as those authorized by Belton and Ross. Accordingly, we do not
address that issue.
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and subjected him to a Terry protective pat-down, which revealed no weapons.
Long and Deputy Lewis then stood by the rear of the vehicle while Deputy Howell shined his flashlight into the interior
of the vehicle, but did not actually enter it. The purpose of
Howell's action was "to search for other weapons." I d., at
469, 320 N. W. 2d, at 868. The officer noticed that something was protruding from under the armrest on the front
seat. He knelt in the vehicle and lifted the armrest. He
saw an open pouch on the front seat, and upon flashing his
light on the pouch, determined that it contained what appeared to be marijuana. After Deputy Howell showed the
pouch and its contents to Deputy Lewis, Long was arrested
for possession of marijuana. A further search of the interior
of the vehicle, including the glovebox, revealed neither more
contraband nor the vehicle registration. The officers decided to impound the vehicle. Deputy Howell opened the
trunk, which did not have a lock, and discovered inside it approximately 75 pounds of marijuana.
The Barry County Circuit Court denied Long's motion to
suppress the marijuana taken from both the interior of the
car and its trunk. He was subsequently convicted of possession of marijuana. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed
Long's conviction, holding that the search of the passenger
compartment was valid as a protective search under Terry,
supra, and that the search of the trunk was valid as an inventory search under South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364
(1976). See 94 Mich. App. 338, 288 N. W. 2d 629 (1979).
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed. The court held that
"the sole justification of the Terry search, protection of the
police officers and others nearby, cannot justify the search in
this case." 413 Mich., at 472, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869. The
marijuana found in Long's trunk was considered by the court
below to be the "fruit" of the illegal search of the interior, and
was also suppressed. 2
2

Chief Justice Coleman dissented, arguing that Ten-y authorized the
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We granted certiorari in this case to consider the important question of the authority of a police officer to protect
himself by conducting a Terry-type search of the passenger
compartment of a motor vehicle during the lawful investigatory stop of the occupant of the vehicle. - - U. S. - (1982).
II
Before reaching the merits, we must consider Long's argument that we are without jurisdiction to decide this case because the decision below rests on an adequate and independent state ground. The court below referred twice to the state
constitution in its opinion, but otherwise relied exclusively on
federal law. 3 Long argues that the Michigan courts have
provided greater protection from searches and seizures
under the state constitution than is afforded under the
Fourth Amendment, and the references to the state constitution therefore establish an adequate and independent ground
for the decision below.
It is, of course, "incumbent upon this Court ... to ascertain for itself ... whether the asserted non-federal ground
independently and adequately supports the judgment."
Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765, 773 (1931). Although we have announced a number of principles in order to
help us determine whether various forms of references to
area search, and that the trunk search was a valid inventory search. See
413 Mich., at 473-480, 320 N. W. 2d, at 870-873. Justice Moody concurred in the result on the ground that the trunk search was improper.
He agreed with Chief Justice Coleman that the interior search was proper
under Terry. See id., at 480-486, 320 N. W. 2d, 873-875.
3
On the first occasion, the court merely cited in a footnote both the
state and federal constitutions. See 413 Mich., at 471 , n. 4, 320 N. W. 2d,
at 869, n. 4. On the second occasion, at the conclusion of the opinion, the
court stated: "We hold , therefore , that the deputies' search of the vehicle
was proscribed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution." /d ., at 472-473, 320
N. W. 2d, at 870.
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state law constitute adequate and independent state
grounds, 4 we openly admit that we have thus far not developed a satisfying and consistent approach for resolving this
vexing issue. In some instances, we have taken the strict
view that if the ground of decision was at all unclear, we
would dismiss the case. See, e. g., Lynch v. New York, 293
U. S. 52 (1934). In other instances, we have vacated, see,
e. g., Minnesota v. National Tea Co, 309 U. S. 551 (1940), or
continued a case, see e. g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117
(1945), in order to obtain clarification about the nature of a
state court decision. See also California v. Krivda, 409
U. S. 33 (1972). In more recent cases, we have ourselves
examined state law to determine whether state courts have
used federal law to guide their application of state law or to
provide the actual basis for the decision that was reached.
See also Delaware v. Prouse, supra, and Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., supra. In Oregon v.
Kennedy,-- U. S. - - , - - - - - (1982), we rejected an
• For example, we have long recognized that "where the judgment of a
state court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal and the other
non-federal in character, our jurisdiction fails if the non-federal ground is
independent of the federal ground and adequate to support the judgment."
Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U. S. 207, 210 (1935). We may review a
state case decided on a federal ground even if it is clear that there was an
available state ground for decision on which the state court could properly
have relied. Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U. S. 35, 37, n. 3 (1967). Also, if,
in our view, the state court "'felt compelled by what it understood to be
federal constitutional considerations to construe ... its own law in the
manner that it did, ' " then we will not treat a normally adequate state
ground as independent, and there will be no question about our jurisdiction. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 653 (1979) (quoting Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 562, 568 (1977)). See also
South Dakota v. Neville, - - U. S. - - , - - , n. 3 (1983). Finally,
"where the non-federal ground is so interwoven with the [federal ground]
as not to be an independent matter, or is not of sufficient breadth to sustain
the judgment without any decision of the other, our jurisdiction is plain."
Enterprise Irrigation District v. Farmers Mutual Canal Company, 243
u. s. 157, 164 (1917).

::S u.
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of an alleged state ground is not apparent from the four corners of the opinion. We have long recognized that dismissal
is inappropriate "where there is strong indication ... that
the federal constitution as judicially construed controlled the
decision below." National Tea Co., supra, 309 U. S., at 556
(1940).
Respect for the independence of state courts, as well as
avoidance of rendering advisory opinions, have been the cornerstones of this Court's refusal to decide cases where there
is an adequate and independent state ground. It is precisely
because of this respect for state courts, and this desire to
avoid advisory opinions, that we do not wish to continue to
decide issues of state law that go beyond the opinion that we
review, or to require state courts to reconsider cases to clarify the grounds of their decisions. Accordingly, when, as in
this case, a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law,
and when the adequacy and independence of any possible
state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we
will no longer reject the most reasonable explanation that the
state court decided the case the way it did because it believed
that federal law required it to do so. If a state court chooses
merely to rely on federal precedents as it would on the precedents of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear
by a plain statement in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only for the purpose of guidance,
and do not themselves compel the result that the court has
reached. In this way, both justice and judicial administration
will be greatly improved. If the state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on
bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds, we,
of course, will not undertake to review the decision. This
approach obviates in most instances the need to examine
state law in order to decide the nature of the state court decision, and will at the same time avoid the danger of our rendering advisory opinions ..,~. It also avoids the unsatisfactory

*There may be certain circumstances in which clarification
is necessary or desirable, and we will not be foreclosed from
taking the appropriate action.
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and intrusive practice of requiring state courts to clarify their
decisions to the satisfaction of this Court. We believe that
such an approach will provide state judges with a clearer
opportunity to develop state jurisprudence unimpeded by
federal interference, and yet will preserve the integrity of
federal law. "It is fundamental that state courts be left free
and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions.
But it is equally important that ambiguous or obscure adjudications by state courts do not stand as barriers to a determination by this Court of the validity under the federal constitution of state action." National Tea Co., supra, 309
U. S., at 557.
Our review of the decision below under this framework
leaves us unconvinced that it rests upon an independent state
ground. Apart from its two citations to the state constitution, the court below relied exclusively on its understanding
of Terry and other federal cases. Not a single state case was
cited to support the state court's holding that the search of
the passenger compartment was unconstitutional. 6 Indeed,
the court declared that the search in this case was unconstitutional because "[t]he Court of Appeals erroneously applied
the principles of Terry v. Ohio ... to the search of the interior of the vehicle in this case." 413 Mich. , at 471, 320 N. W.
2d, at 869. The references to the state constitution in no
way indicate that the decision below rested on grounds in any
6

At oral argument, Long argued that the state court relied on its decision in People v. Reed, 393 Mich. 342, 224 N. W. 2d 867, cert. denied, 422
U. S. 1044 (1975). See Tr. of Oral Arg. , at 29. However, the court cited
that case only in the context of a statement that the State did not seek to
justify the search in this case "by reference to other exceptions to the warrant requirement. " 413 Mich., at 472, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869--870 (footnote
omitted). The court then noted that Reed held that "A warrantless search
and seizure is unreasonable per se and violates the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and art. 1, § 11 of the state constitution unless shown to be within one of the exceptions to the rule." /d. , at 472-473,
n. 8, 320 N. W. 2d, at 870, n. 8.
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way independent from the state court's interpretation of federal law. Even if we accept that the Michigan constitution
has been interpreted to provide independent protection for
certain rights also secured under the Fourth Amendment, it
fairly appears in this case that the Michigan Supreme Court
rested its decision primarily on federal law.
Rather than dismissing the case, or requiring that the
state court reconsider its decision on our behalf solely because of a mere possibility that an adequate and independent
ground supports the judgment, we find that we have jurisdiction in the absence of a plain statement that the decision
below rested on an adequate and independent state ground.
It appears to us that the state court "felt compelled by what
it understood to be federal constitutional considerations to
construe . . . its own law in the manner that it did."
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S.
562, 568 (1977). 7
7

There is nothing unfair about requiring a plain statement of an independent state ground in this case. Even if we were to rest our decision on
an evaluation of the state law relevant to Long's claim, as we have sometimes done in the past, our understanding of Michigan law would also result
in our finding that we have jurisdiction to decide this case. Under state
search and seizure law, a "higher standard" is imposed under art. 1, § 11 of
the 1963 Michigan Constitution. See People v. Secrist, 413 Mich. 521, 525,
321 N. W. 2d 368, 369 (1982). If, however, the item seized is, inter alia, a
"narcotic drug . . . seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any
dwelling house in this state," art 1, § 11 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution,
then the seizure is governed by a standard identical to that imposed by the
Fourth Amendment. See People v. Moore, 391 Mich. 426, 435, 216 N. W.
2d 770, 775 (1974).
Long argues that under the current Michigan Public Health Code
§ 333.7107, the definition of a "narcotic" does not include marijuana. The
difficulty with this argument is that Long fails to cite any authority for the
proposition that the term "narcotic" as used in the Michigan constitution is
dependent on current statutory definitions of that term. Indeed, it appears that just the opposite is true. The Michigan Supreme Court has
held that constitutional provisions are presumed "to be interpreted in accordance with existing laws and legal usages of the time" of the passage of

82-256-0PINION
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III
The court below held, and respondent Long contends, that
Deputy Howell's entry into the vehicle cannot be justified
under the principles set forth in Terry because Terry authorized only a limited pat-down search of a person suspected of
criminal activity rather than a search of an area. 413 Mich.,
at 472, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869 (footnote omitted). Brief for
Respondent, p. 10. Although Terry did involve the protective frisk of a person, we believe that the police action in this
case is justified by the principles that we have already established in Terry and other cases.
In Terry, the Court examined the validity of a "stop and
frisk" in the absence of probable cause and a warrant. The
police officer in Terry detained several suspects to ascertain
their identities after the officer had observed the suspects for
a brief period of time and formed the conclusion that they
the provision. Bacon v. Kent-Ottawa Authority, 354 Mich. 159, 169, 92
N. W. 2d 492, 497 (1958). If the state legislature were able to change the
interpretation of a constitutional provision by statute, then the legislature
would have "the power of outright repeal of a duly-voted constitutional
provision." Ibid.
Applying these principles, the Michigan courts have
held that a statute passed subsequent to the applicable state constitutional
provision is not relevant for interpreting its constitution, and that a definition in a legislative act pertains only to that act. Jones v. City of Ypsilanti, 26 Mich. App. 574, 182 N. W. 2d 795 (1970). See also Walber v.
Wayne Circuit Judge, 2 Mich. App. 145, 138 N. W. 2d 772 (1966), affd, 381
Mich. 138, 160 N. W. 2d 876 (1968). At the time that the 1963 Michigan
Constitution was enacted, it is clear that marijuana was considered a narcotic drug. See 1961 Mich. Pub. Acts, No. 266, § 1. Indeed, it appears
that marijuana was considered a narcotic drug in Michigan until1978, when
We would conclude that
it was removed from the narcotic classification.
the seizure of marijuana in Michigan is not subject to analysis under any
"higher standard" that may be imposed on the seizure of other items. In
the light of our holding in Delaware v. Prouse, supra, that an interpretation of state law in our view compelled by federal constitutional considerations is not an independent state ground, we would have jurisdiction to
decide the case.
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were about to engage in criminal activity. Because the officer feared that the suspects were armed, he patted down the
outside of the suspects' clothing and discovered two revolvers.
Examining the reasonableness of the officer's conduct in
Terry, 8 we held that there is "'no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or
seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails."' 392 U. S., at 21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U. S. 523, 53(H)37 (1967)). Although the conduct
of the officer in Terry involved a "severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security," 392 U. S., at 24-25,
we found that the conduct was reasonable when we weighed
the interest of the individual against the legitimate interest
in "crime detection and prevention," id., at 23, and the "need
for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other
prospective victims of violence in situations where they lack
probable cause for an arrest." I d., at 24. When the officer
has a reasonable belief "that the individual whose suspicious
behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to
be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take
Although we did not in any way weaken the warrant requirement, we
acknowledged that the typical "stop and frisk" situation involves "an entire
rubric of police conduct-necessarily swift action predicated upon the onthe-spot observations of the officer on the beat-which historically has not
been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure. Instead, the conduct in this case must be tested by the Fourth
Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures." 392 U. S., at 20 (footnote omitted). We have emphasized that
the propriety of a Terry stop and frisk is to be judged according to whether
the officer acted as a "reasonably prudent man" in deciding that the intrusion was justified. Terry, supra, 392 U. S., at 27. "A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most
reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time. " Adams
v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 146 (1972).
8
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necessary measures to determine whether the person is in
fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm." Ibid.
Although Terry itself involved the stop and subsequent
pat-down search of a person, we were careful to note that
"[w]e need not develop at length in this case, however, the
limitations which the Fourth Amendment places upon a protective search and seizure for weapons. These limitations
will have to be developed in the concrete factual circumstances of individual cases." !d. at 29. Contrary to Long's
view, Terry did not restrict the preventative search to the
person of the detained suspect. 9
In two cases in which we applied Terry to specific factual
situations, we recognized that investigative detentions involving suspects in vehicles are especially fraught with danger to police officers. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434
U. S. 106 (1972), we held that police may order persons out of
an automobile during a stop for a traffic violation, and may
frisk those persons for weapons if there is a reasonable belief
that they are armed and dangerous. Our decision rested in
part on the "inordinate risk confronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in an automobile." ld. , at 110. In
Adams v. Williams , 407 U. S. 143 (1972), we held that the
police, acting on an informant's tip, may reach into the passenger compartment of an automobile to remove a gun from a
driver's waistband even where the gun was not apparent to
police from outside the car and the police knew of its exist• As Chief Justice Coleman noted in her dissenting opinion in the
present case:
"The opinion in Terry authorized the frisking of an overcoat worn by defendant because that was the issue presented by the facts. One could reasonably conclude that a different result would not have been constitutionally required if the overcoat had been carried, folded over the forearm ,
rather than worn. The constitutional principles in Terry would still
control. "
413 Mich., at 475-476, 320 N. W. 2d, at 871 (Coleman, C. J. , dissenting).
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ence only because of the tip. Again, our decision rested in
part on our view of the danger presented to police officers in
"traffic stop" and automobile situations. 10
Finally, we have also expressly recognized that suspects
may injure police officers and others by virtue of their access
to weapons, even though they may not themselves be armed.
In the Term following Terry, we decided Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969), which involved the limitations imposed on police authority to conduct a search incident to a
valid arrest. Relying explicitly on Terry, we held that when
an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to
search "the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control'-construing that phrase to mean the area from
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." I d., at 763. We reasoned that "[a]
gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested
can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed
in the clothing of the person arrested." Ibid. In New York
v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981), we determined that the lower
courts "have found no workable definition of 'the area within
the immediate control of the arrestee' when that area arguably includes the interior of an automobile and the arrestee is
its recent occupant." I d., at 460. In order to provide a
"workable rule," ibid., we held that "articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an
automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably,
within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order
to grab a weapon' .... " Ibid. (quoting Chimel, supra, 395
U. S., at 763). We also held that the police may examine the
contents of any open or closed container found within the pas"According to one study, approximately 30% of police shootings occurred when a police officer approached a suspect seated in an automobile.
Bristow, Police Officer Shootings-A Tactical Evaluation, 54
J.Crim.L.C.& P.S. 93 (1963) ." Adams v. Williams, supra, 407 U. S., at
148, n. 3.
'
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senger compartment, "for if the passenger compartment is
within the reach of the arrestee, so will containers in it be
within his reach." 453 U. S., at 460. (footnote omitted).
See also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 702 (1981).
Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and
others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger, that roadside
encounters between police and suspects are especially hazardous, and that danger may arise from the possible presence
of weapons in the area surrounding a suspect. These principles compel our conclusion that the search of the passenger
compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in
which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the
police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on "specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the officers
to believe that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may
gain immediate control of weapons. 11 See Terry, 392 U. S. ,
We stress that our decision does not mean that the police may conduct
automobile searches whenever they conduct an investigative stop, although
the "bright line" that we drew in Belton clearly authorizes such a search
whenever officers effect a custodial arrest. An additional interest exists
in the arrest context, i. e., preservation of evidence, and this justifies an
"automatic" search. However, that additional interest does not exist in
the Terry context. A Terry search, "unlike a search without a warrant
incident to a lawful arrest, is not justified by any need to prevent the disappearance or destruction of evidence of crime . .. . The sole justification of
the search ... is the protection of police officers and others nearby .. .. "
392 U. S., at 29. What we borrow now from Chimel and Belton is merely
the recognition that part of the reason to allow area searches incident to an
arrest is that the arrestee, who may not himself be armed, may be able to
gain access to weapons to injure officers or others nearby , or otherwise to
hinder legitimate police activity. This recognition applies as well in the
Terry context. However, because the interest in collecting and preserving evidence is not present in the Terry context, we require that officers
who conduct area searches during investigative detentions must do so only
when they have the level of suspicion identified in Terry.
11
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at 21. "The issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in
the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his
safety or those of others was in danger." I d., at 27. If a
suspect is "dangerous," he is no less dangerous simply because he is not arrested. If, while conducting a legitimate
Terry search of the interior of the automobile, the officer
should, as here, discover contraband other than weapons, he
clearly cannot be required to ignore the contraband, and the
Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression in such
circumstances. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443,
465 (1971); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978);
Texas v. Brown,-- U.S.--,--,-- (1983) (plurality
opinion by REHNQUIST, J., and opinion concurring in the
judgment by POWELL, J.).
The circumstances of this case clearly justified Deputies
Howell and Lewis in their reasonable belief that Long posed
a danger if he were permitted to reenter his vehicle. The
hour was late and the area rural. Long was driving his automobile at excessive speed, and his car swerved into a ditch.
The officers had to repeat their questions to Long, who appeared to be "under the influence" of some intoxicant. The
intrusion was "strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which
justifi[ed] its initiation." Terry, supra, 392 U. S., at 26.
Long was not frisked until the officers observed that there
was a large knife in the interior of the car into which Long
was about to reenter. The subsequent search of the car was
restricted to those areas to which Long would generally have
immediate control, and that could contain a weapon. The trial
court determined that the leather pouch containing marijuana could have contained a weapon. App. 64a. 12
"The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all circumstances of the
particular government invasion of a citizen's personal secu12

Of course, our analysis would apply to justify the search of Long's person that was conducted by the officers after the discovery of the knife.
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rity."' Pennsylvania v. Mimms, supra, 434 U. S., at
108-109 (quoting Terry, supra, 392 U. S., at 19). In this
case, the officers did not act unreasonably in not permitting
Long to reenter his automobile before taking preventive
measures to ensure that there were no other weapons within
Long's immediate grasp. Therefore, the balancing required
by Terry clearly weighs in favor of permitting the police to
conduct an area search to uncover weapons, as long as they
possess an articulable belief that the suspect is potentially
dangerous.
The Michigan Supreme Court appeared to believe that it
was not reasonable for the officers to believe that Long could
injure them, because he was effectively under their control
during the investigative stop and could not get access to any
weapons that might have been located in the automobile. See
413 Mich., at 472, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869. This reasoning is
mistaken in several respects. During any investigative detention, the suspect is "in the control" of the officers in the
sense that he "may be briefly detained against his will . . . . "
Terry, supra, 392 U. S., at 34 (WHITE, J., concurring). Just
as a Terry suspect on the street may, despite being under the
brief control of a police officer, reach into his clothing andretrieve a weapon, so might a Terry suspect in Long's position
break away from police control and retrieve a weapon from
his automobile. See United States v. Rainone, 586 F. 2d
1132, 1134 (CA7 1978), cert. denied, 440 U. S. 980 (1979). In
addition, if the suspect is not placed under arrest, he will be
permitted to reenter his automobile, and he will then have access to any weapons inside. United States v. Powless, 546
F. 2d 792, 795-796 (CA8), cert. denied, 430 U. S. 910 (1977).
Or, as here, the suspect may be permitted to reenter the vehicle before the Terry investigation is over, and again, may
have access to weapons. In any event, we stress that a
Terry investigation, such as the one that occurred here, involves a police investigation "at close range," Terry, supra,
392 U. S., at 24, when the officer remains particularly vul-
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nerable in part because a full custodial arrest has not been
effected, and the officer must make a "quick decision as to
how to protect himself and others from possible danger."
Id., at 28. In such circumstances, we have not required that
officers adopt alternate means to ensure their safety in order
to avoid the intrusion involved in a Terry encounter. 13
IV
The trial court and the court of appeals upheld the search
of the trunk as a valid inventory search under this Court's decision in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (1976).
The Michigan Supreme Court did not address this holding,
and instead suppressed the marijuana taken from the trunk
as a fruit of the illegal search of the interior of the automobile. Our holding that the initial search was justified under
Terry makes it necessary to determine whether the trunk
search was permissible under the Fourth Amendment.
However, we decline to address this question because it was
not passed upon by the Michigan Supreme Court, whose deciLong makes a number of arguments concerning the invalidity of the
search of the passenger compartment. The thrust of these arguments is
that Terry searches are limited in scope and that an area search is fundamentally inconsistent with this limited scope. We have recognized that
Terry searches are limited insofar as they may not be conducted in the absence of an articulable suspicion that the intrusion is justified, see e. g.,
Sibron v. New York , 392 U. S. 40, 65 (1968), and that they are protective
in nature and limited to weapons, see Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85,
9~94 (1979). However, neither of these concerns is violated by our decision. To engage in an area search, which is limited to seeking weapons,
the officer must have an articulable suspicion that the suspect is potentially
dangerous.
Long also argues that there cannot be a legitimate Terry search based on
the discovery of the hunting knife because Long possessed that weapon legally. See Brief for Respondent, p. 17. Assuming arguendo that Long
possessed the knife lawfully, we have expressly rejected the view that the
validity of a Terry search depends on whether the weapon is possessed in
accordance with state law. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 146
(1972).
'
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sion we review in this case. See Cardinale v. Louisiana,
394 U. S. 437, 438 (1969). We remand this issue to the court
below, to enable it to determine whether the trunk search
was permissible under Opperman, supra, or other decisions
of this Court. See, e. g., United States v. Ross,-- U. S.
- - , (1982). 14

v

The decision of the Michigan Supreme Court is reversed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

Long suggests that the trunk search is invalid under state law. See
Tr. of Oral Arg., at 41, 4344. The Michigan Supreme Court is, of course,
free to determine the validity of that search under state law.
14
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To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Rives

Re: No. 82-256, Michigan v. Long

When a state court decision contains references to both
state and federal law, Justice O'Connor's opinion establishes the
following "plain statement" rule for determining this Court's
jurisdiction:

if a state court decision "fairly appears to rest
federal law," the Court will presume that it has

jurisdiction unless the state court has indicated clearly and
expressly that its judgment rests on independent and adequate state
As a working princi£le, the rule appears salutary.

-----------------

By

requiring a clear statement that the opinion rests on independent
and adequate state grounds, it keeps this Court from having to
inquire into state law to determine its jurisdiction.

And it may

prevent state judges from relying on federal law, but insulating
their decision from review by including a brief reference to state
law.

Thus, it seems that practical considerations counsel in favor

of adopting such a rule.
But there are theoretical problems with such a rule, and

-::::-

for the following reasons I would recommend against joining Justice
O'Connor's plain statement rule.

It is well established that when a

state court's judgment rests on independent and adequate state

2.

grounds this Court has no jurisdiction to review the state court's
decision.

Because the presence of state grounds raises

jurisdictional questions, the Court previously has been reluctant to
'l
~\
decide cases where there is a substantial possiblity that the state
judgment does not rest on federal grounds.

In such cases, the Court

either has reviewed state law, declined jurisdiction or remanded to
the States to allow them to explain the grounds on which their
decisions rest.

See, e.g., California v. Krivda, 409

(1972): Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309

u.s.

u.s.

33

551 (1940): Herb v.

Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
Justice O'Connors' approach departs from this established
precedent.

She does not examine the cases to see whether the

decision below rests on federal or state law.

Rather, she resolves

any doubts in favor of the Court's jurisdiction and thus causes the
Court to exercise its power where it may have none.

The proposed

plain statement rule seems to me a departure from the Court's
constant recognition that because it is a court of limited
jurisdiction it will be reluctant to exercise its jurisdiction when
it is in doubt.
A s cond

ith the rule announced by the opinion

is that it seems fa1rly intrusive on state court authority.

The

state courts are under no obligation to keep state and federal law
separate.

As Justice Jackson stated in Herb v. Pitcairn, "[state]

courts may ajudicate both kinds of questions and because it is not
necessary to their functions to make a sharp separation of the two
their discussion is often interlaced."

324

u.s.,

at 127.

Only this

Court has an obligation to limit its jurisdiction to questions of

vr-

federal law.

Thus, any plain statement rule is a

requ~'ent

benefit ~ If

imposed on the state courts for this Court's

3.

this Court

had supervisory powers over the States it would make sense to have a
plain statement rule, but it is less clear to me that there is a
clear source of authority that justifies requiring state courts to
explain their decisions in any particular fashion. 1
Finally, the plain statement rule presumes that the state
courts intended to rely on federal authority, unless they state
otherwise.

Again,

as ~ tice Ja~ remarked

in Herb v. Pitcairn:

"it seems consistent with the respect due the highest courts of
states of the Union that they be asked rather than told what they
have intended.

If this imposes an unwelcome burden it should be

mitigated by the knowledge that it is to protect their jurisdiction
from unwitting interference as well as to protect our own from
unwitting renunciation."

324

u.s.,

at 127-128.

I realize that

researching state law or remanding cases is not the most efficient
way of dealing with these types of cases, but it seems more
consistent than the plain statement rule with concepts of
federalism, such as the allocation of authority between state and
federal courts.
Your dissenting opinion in City of Mesquitte v. Alladdin's

1The authority to promulgate such a rule may derive from this
Court's power to decide its own jurisdiction. Thus, even when
the Court's jurisdiction has been unclear, it has assumed
jurisdiction, vacated and remanded for the state court to explain
the basis of its decision. This plain statement requirement
could be justified as a less intrusive way of determining the
Court's own jurisdiction.

'·

.

f I~

!

l

1

4.

Castle seems to be more in line with the traditional approach to
these questions than the approach proposed in Justice O'Connor's
draft.

In City of Mesquitte, the Court of Appeals 2 had relied on

both federal and state law to hold a state statute unconstitutional.
You took a searching look at the state court decisions cited below
and concluded that these state decisions had relied on federal law.
Thus the Court of Appeals' passing reference to state decisions did
not divest this Court of jurisdiction.

As I read your opinion, this

Court may exercise jurisdiction where it is clear that the opinion
below did not rely on state law and this Court may examine the cases
to make that determination.

As I read Justice O'Connor's opinion,

she would eschew the kind of close look that you took in City of
Mesquitte.

Under her approach, the ambiguity that existed in City

of Mesquitte would be resolved in favor of this Court's jurisdiction
without further inquiry.

While City of Mesquitte does not support

Justice O'Connor's approach, I would not think it would preclude you
from joining her opinion.

Justice O'Connor acknowledges that the

Court has tried varying ways of dealing with the independent and
adequate state grounds issue and states that they have been
inefficient.

Thus, the opinion admittedly is a departure from past

precedent and one could join it on that basis.
If you are inclined to join, it seems to me that are
strong practical reasons for adopting the rule proposed by the

2 The posture of these cases is different. City of Mesquitte
came from a federal court, while this case comes from a state
court. Thus, in City of Mesquitte there was less reason for this
Court to refrain from reaching the federal question.

~·

5.
opinion.

And I do not see that many problems with Justice

O'Connor's general treatment of the issue.

Specific criticisms that

might be noted are as follows (my constructive suggestions are 3 and
4; 1 and 2 are primarily quibbles with the opinion's reasoning):

1.

On page 6, the opinion states that remanding to have a state

court clarify the basis for its judgment "place[s] significant
burdens on state courts to demonstrate the presence or absence of
our jurisdiction."

But the plain statement rule places the same

burden on the state courts and does so for precisely the same
reason.

2.

On page 6, the opinion states that dismissal of cases is not a

feasible alternative because the need for federal uniformity is
frustrated when "we fail to review an opinion that rests primarily
upon federal grounds and where the independence of an alleged state
ground is not apparent from the four corners of the opinion."

There

is a great deal of force to this argument, but it is not clear that
acceptance of a plain statement rule would cure this lack of
uniformity completely.

A state court could choose to make

alternative state and federal holdings, each independent of the
other.

In such a case, the federal holding would be unreviewable

and would frustrate the goal of federal uniformity.

It would seem

that the Court has accepted some lack of uniformity as a cost of
having a federal system.

Further, any conflict can be resolved by a

subsequent decision of this Court.

3.

On page 7,

he opinion states that adopting a plain statement

rule "obvia es in most instances the need to examine state law •••
and wi 11

the same time avoid the danger of our rendering advisory
It is questionable whether the plain statement rule will

avoid the danger of rendering advisory opinions.

Under such a rule,

the Court will decide federal issues in cases where it is arguable
that the judgment rests on independent and adequate state grounds,
thereby increasing the likelihood that the federal opinion will be
advisory.

I assume Justice O'Connor must mean that a plain

1

statement rule will prevent the Court from rendering advisory
opinions on state law.

It might be helpful to make that point

clear.

4.

On pages 8-9, the opinion applies the test that it announced.

But in so doing, the opinion combs through the case to find whether
it relied on federal or state law.

It even notes circumstances

outside of the four corners of the document--i.e., Michigan's
treatment of the Fourth Amendment in other cases--to determine
whether the lower court's decision rests on state or federal law.
This sort of inquiry undercuts the test the opinion just
established.

In my view, the opinion would be stronger if it simply

noted that the decision below relies primarily on Terry v. Ohio and
that it contains no "plain statement ••• that the federal cases
[did] not themselves compel the result that the court ••• reached."
(p. 7}.

By engaging in a less searching analysis, the Court would

demonstrate that it means to apply its plain statement rule
strictly.

March 15, 1983
82-256 Michigan v. Lona

Oear Bill:
Since undertaking the dissent in this caAe, I have
looked more thoroughly at r.Uchigan law. 'rhts has lee'! me to
question my initial view that the judgment below rested on
independent and adequate state grounds.
As a general matter I believe Michigan has inter preteii art 1, §11 independently of the Fourth Amendment. As
the Supreme Court of Michigan explicitly stated in People v.
Secrest, 413 Mich. 521, 525 (1982), "we have imPosed a higher standarn under the state provision than the federal when
the item seized is not one within the proviso of the third
sentence of art 1, ~11." But I do not believe that Secrest
controls this case.
'T'he problem arises from the proviso to art l, ~11.
states "[t]he provisions of this sectton shall not be
construed to bar from evidence in any criminal proceeding
any narcotic drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or any other
dangerous weapon, seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in this state." Thus, even if
a search otherwise would be unreasonable under art 1, ~11,
the proviso purports to prevent certain categories of evidence obtained duri.ng the search from being excluded at
critrtine'\l trials.
th~t

As a state con~titution cannot authorize the admission of evi.dence that the federaJ constitution would exclude, Michigan has recognized that the effect of the proviso is to wpreclud[e] a construction of the Michi~an sea~ch
and seizure clause imposing a higher standard of reasonableness for searches and seizures of items named in the provision than the United States Supreme Court has held applicable under the Fourth Amendment . " People v . Moore, 391 Mich.
426, 435 (1974). ~he exclusion of evidence of the types
specified in this proviso therefore is governed by the federal constitution. Thus, the issue on which this case ultimately turns appears to he whether marijuana {the druq involved here) is a "narcotic drug" within the meaning of the
proviso .
The respondent's brief asserts that the proviso is
not applicable because Michigan no longer classifies marijuana as a narcotic. See 1978 Mich . Pub. Acts 368 (codified
at Mich. Comp . Laws Ann. §333 . 7107) . The Michigan courts
have held consistently, however, that state constitutional

provisions should be interpreted in light of the laws existing when the provisions were ratified. See Bacon v. KentOttawa Authority, 354 Mich. 159, 170-171 (1958). Indeed,
the state courts appear to have been rather strict about not
construing constituti.onal provisions in light of subsequent
statutory changes. See Walker v. Wayne Circui.t Judqe, 2
Mich. App. 145, 148-149 (1.966): Jones v. Citv of Ypsilanti,
26 Mich. App. 574, 578-579 (1970). As marijuana was classified as a narcotic drug when the state constitution was ratified in 1963, see 1961 Mich. Pub. Acts 206, I doubt that
the subsequent statutory chanae alters the coverage of the
proviso.
Although the state courts have not addressed the
specific question whether mariiuana is a narcotic, they appear to have assumed that marijuana falls within the coverage of the proviso. In People v. Monroe, 3 Mich. App. 544
(1966), the state court did not bother to consider whether
the search that led to the discovery of mariiuana wn~ prohibited by the first part of art 1, Sll but simply admitted
the marijuana into evidence on the basis of the J?roviso.
See also People v. Barket:, 18 "'1ich. Aop. '=>44 (1.969) (Levin,
,J., concur.r ing) • But cf. People v. Smith, 31 Mich. App. 366,
373 (1971) (apparently holding that the li'ourth Amendment
voided the proviso to art 1, §ll).
Even if the state courts were to disregard the law
existing at the time the constitutional provision was ratified, the purpose of the proviso clearly appears to have
been to allow the admissJ.on of contraband at criminal trials. This betnq so, it is unlikely Michiqan would apply its
"higher standard" to any type of contraband drug. In this
case, the Michigan court stated that the search was invalid
under both the federal and state constitutions. Equating
the two provisions suqgests that the court had in mind its
recognition that the proviso, which is applicable to
contraband-type articles, had been construed to conform to
the federal constitution. This perhaps explains why the
court did not undertake any i.ndependent analysis of the
state constitution but relied solely upon this court's
Fourth Amendment decisions.
As you know, Bill, I was inclined to agree with
majority on the mPrits but initially shared vour view that
the case should be disposed of as resting on independent and
adequate st~te grounds. Since I now have substantial questions about the independence of the state grounds, I am
afraid I must give up the dissent.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
lfp/ss
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I have read with special interest your first draft ~
of an opinion in this case, a draft not yet circulated. I <t
make the following observations: . __ ,.
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Your "plain sta te~ent" ,·rul~e for ' deterl'lin inq th i's' . ~ ,
Court's jurisdiction would be: If a state court's decision )~~
"fairly . appears to rest primarily on federal la•li, "' we will /·~""i~
presume that this Court has jurisdiction unless the state
~~
court has indicated clearly and expressly that its judgment
rests on indepenrlent and adequate state grounds. As a working principle the rule is salutary and practi,cal consider,-::- ·
at ions!.t~~;st,ronq ly·· .' support .i t.
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·
There are, as I am sure you fully ~ppreciate,
theoretical problems with such a rule. It ~_i. s elementary
that this Court h~s no jurisdiction where a state court's
judgment rests on independent and adequate state grounds.
As this is a jurisdictional question, we have thought it
necessary either to remand a doubtful case to the state
court or we have undertaken our own review of. state law. I :.1r
took this approach recently in my dissenting opinion in City
of Mesquite v. Alladin's Castle (last Term).
~

c ~ ustice Jackson addressed this problem in Herb
v. Pitcairn~ 324 u.s. 117 (1945), in which - among other
relevant statements ., - he said:
10)'--,.

'·

"lilt seems consistent with respect to the
highest courts of states of the Union that
they be asked rather than told what they have
int~nded.
If this imposei~ an unwelcome burden i t ~, should be mitigated· by the knowledgE>
that it is to protect their jurisdiction from
unwitting interference as well as to protect
our own frorn unwitting renunciation." . Id.,
127-128.
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I confess being torn between the obvious advantage
to us of your "Plain statement" rule and the tradi.tional <,if,···'
'i concern of this Court not to exercise a jurisdiction tha e ":- ,
·,.might in fact properly lie with a state. After all, we are
~··· a court of limited jurisdiction.
On balance, however, I
would join four other Justices in adapting your rule in view
of the strong practical reasons that justify it.
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Perhaps it would be desirable for your opinion to
somewhat more specifically what I have called the
theoretical problems with a pragmatic rule. tn my view,
these problems are more theoretical than realistic - since
complying with "YYUr prouosed rule would har~ly be burdensome
except where a state court may have reason deliberately to
pass the buck to us as perhaPs the Michigan courts have been
doing.
,
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I note that in this case, your footnote 7 actuallv
disposes of any argument that the decision below was based '·
on an independent and adequate state ground.
,,

d

~·~

I appreciate your givinq me the OPPortunity
make advance comments on your OPinion. I aoolaud your
purposes and willingness to undertake an answer to this
problem.
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OF MICHIGAN
[May - , 1983]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), we upheld the validity
of a protective search for weapons in the absence of probable
cause to arrest because it is unreasonable to deny a police officer the right "to neutralize the threat of physical harm," id.,
at 24, when he possesses an articulable suspicion that an individual is armed and dangerous. We did not, however, expressly address whether such a protective search for weapons could extend to an area beyond the person in the absence
of probable cause to arrest. In the present case, respondent
David Long was convicted for possession of marijuana found
by police in the passenger compartment and trunk of the
automobile that he was driving. The police searched the
passenger compartment because they had reason to believe
that the vehicle contained weapons potentially dangerous to
the officers. We hold that the protective search of the passenger compartment was reasonable under the principles
articulated in Terry and other decisions of this Court. We
also examine Long's argument that the decision below rests
upon an adequate and independent state ground, and we decide in favor of our jurisdiction.
I

Deputies Howell and Lewis were on patrol in a rural area
one evening when, shortly after midnight, they observed a

.I
{
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car traveling erratically and at excessive speed. 1 The officers observed the car. turning down a side road, where it
swerved off into a shallow ditch. The officers stopped to investigate. Long, the only occupant of the automobile, met
the deputies at the rear of the car, which was protruding
from the ditch onto the road. The door on the driver's side
of the vehicle was left open.
Deputy Howell requested Long to produce his operator's
license, but he did not respond. After the request was repeated, Long produced his license. Long again failed to respond when Howell requested him to produce the vehicle
registration. After another repeated request, Long, whom
Howell thought "appeared to be under the influence of something," 413 Mich. 461, 469, 320 N. W. 2d 866, 868 (1982),
turned from the officers and began walking toward the open
door of the vehicle. The officers followed Long and both observed a large hunting knife on the floorboard of the driver's
side of the car. The officers then stopped Long's progress
It is clear, and the respondent concedes, that if the officers had arrested Long for speeding or for driving while intoxicated, they could have
searched the passenger compartment under New York v. Belton, 453 U. S.
454 (1981), and the trunk under United States v. Ross, - - U. S. - (1982), if they had probable cause to believe that the trunk contained contraband. See Tr. Oral Arg., at 41. However, at oral argument, the State
informed us that while Long could have been arrested for a speeding violation under Michigan law, he was not arrested because "[a]s a matter of
practice," police in Michigan do not arrest for speeding violations unless
"more" is involved. See Tr. Oral Arg., at 6. The officers did issue Long
an appearance ticket. The petitioner also confirmed that the officers could
have arrested Long for driving while intoxicated but they "would have to
go through a process to make a determination as to whether the party is
intoxicated and then go from that point." I d., at 6.
The court below treated this case as involving a protective search, and
not a search justified by probable cause to arrest for speeding, driving
while intoxicated, or any other offense. Further, the petitioner does not
argue that if probable cause to arrest exists, but the officers do not actually
effect the arrest, that the police may nevertheless conduct a search as
broad as those authorized by Belton and Ross. Accordingly, we do not
address that issue.
1
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and subjected him to a Terry protective pat-down, which revealed no weapons.
Long and Deputy Lewis then stood by the rear of the vehicle while Deputy Howell shined his flashlight into the interior
of the vehicle, but did not actually enter it. The purpose of
Howell's action was "to search for other weapons." I d., at
469, 320 N. W. 2d, at 868. The officer noticed that something was protruding from under the armrest on the front
seat. He knelt in the vehicle and lifted the armrest. He
saw an open pouch on the front seat, and upon flashing his
light on the pouch, determined that it contained what appeared to be marijuana. After Deputy Howell showed the
pouch and its contents to Deputy Lewis, Long was arrested
for possession of marijuana. A further search of the interior
of the vehicle, including the glovebox, revealed neither more
contraband nor the vehicle registration. The officers decided to impound the vehicle. Deputy Howell opened the
trunk, which did not have a lock, and discovered inside it approximately 75 pounds of marijuana.
The Barry County Circuit Court denied Long's motion to
suppress the marijuana taken from both the interior of the
car and its trunk. He was subsequently convicted of possession of marijuana. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed
Long's conviction, holding that the search of the passenger
compartment was valid as a protective search under Terry,
supra, and that the search of the trunk was valid as an inventory search under South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364
(1976). See 94 Mich. App. 338, 288 N. W. 2d 629 (1979).
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed. The court held that
"the sole justification of the Terry search, protection of the
police officers and others nearby, cannot justify the search in
this case." 413 Mich., at 472, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869. The
marijuana found in Long's trunk was considered by the court
below to be the "fruit" of the illegal search of the interior, and
was also suppressed. 2
2

Chief Justice Coleman dissented, arguing that Terry authorized the
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We granted certiorari in this case to consider the important question of the authority of a police officer to protect
himself by conducting a Terry-type search of the passenger
compartment of a motor vehicle during the lawful investigatory stop of the occupant of the vehicle. - - U. S. - (1982).
II
Before reaching the merits, we must consider Long's argument that we are without jurisdiction to decide this case because the decision below rests on an adequate and independent state ground. The court below referred twice to the
state constitution in its opinion, but otherwise relied exclusively on federal law. 3 Long argues that the Michigan
courts have provided greater protection from searches and
seizures under the state constitution than is afforded under
the Fourth Amendment, and the references to the state constitution therefore establish an adequate and independent
ground for the decision below.
It is, of course, "incumbent upon this Court ... to ascertain for itself ... whether the asserted non-federal ground
independently and adequately supports the judgment."
Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765, 773 (1931). Although we have announced a number of principles in order
to help us determine whether various forms of references
area search, and that the trunk search was a valid inventory search. See
413 Mich., at 473-480, 320 N. W. 2d, at 870-873. Justice Moody concurred in the result on the ground that the trunk search was improper.
He agreed with Chief Justice Coleman that the interior search was proper
under Terry. See id., at 480-486, 320 N. W. 2d, 873-875.
3
On the first occasion, the court merely cited in a footnote both the
state and federal constitutions. See 413 Mich., at 471 , n. 4, 320 N. W. 2d,
at 869, n. 4. On the second occasion, at the conclusion of the opinion, the
court stated: "We hold, therefore, that the deputies' search of the vehicle
was proscribed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution. " Id. , at 472-473, 320
N. W. 2d, at 870.
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to state law constitute adequate and independent state
grounds, 4 we openly admit that we have thus far not developed a satisfying and consistent approach for resolving this
vexing issue. In some instances, we have taken the strict
view that if the ground of decision was at all unclear, we
would dismiss the case. See, e. g., Lynch v. New York, 293
U. S. 52 (1934). In other instances, we have vacated, see,
e. g., Minnesota v. National Tea Co, 309 U. S. 551 (1940), or
continued a case, see e. g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117
(1945), in order to obtain clarification about the nature of a
state court decision. See also California v. Krivda, 409
U. S. 33 (1972). In more recent cases, we have ourselves
examined state law to determine whether state courts have
used federal law to guide their application of state law
or to provide the actual basis for the decision that was
reached. See also Delaware v. Prouse, supra, and Zacchini
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., supra. In Oregon v.
Kennedy,-- U.S.--,----- (1982), we rejected an
'For example, we have long recognized that "where the judgment of a
state court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal and the other
non-federal in character, our jurisdiction fails if the non-federal ground is
independent of the federal ground and adequate to support the judgment."
Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U. S. 207, 210 (1935). We may review a
state case decided on a federal ground even if it is clear that there was an
available state ground for decision on which the state court could properly
have relied. Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U. S. 35, 37, n. 3 (1967). Also, if,
in our view, the state court" 'felt compelled by what it understood to be
federal constitutional considerations to construe ... its own law in the
manner that it did,' " then we will not treat a normally adequate state
ground as independent, and there will be no question about our jurisdiction. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 653 (1979) (quoting Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 568 (1977)). See also
South Dakota v. Neville, - - U. S. - - , - - , n. 3 (1983). Finally,
"where the non-federal ground is so interwoven with the [federal ground]
as not to be an independent matter, or is not of sufficient breadth to sustain
the judgment without any decision of the other, our jurisdiction is plain."
Enterprise Irrigation District v. Farmers Mutual Canal Company, 243
u. s. 157, 164 (1917).

I
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invitation to remand to the state court for clarification even
when the decision rested in part on a case from the state
court, because we determined that the state case itself rested
upon federal grounds. We added that "[e]ven if the case admitted of more doubt as to whether federal and state grounds
were intermixed, the fact that the state court relied to the
extent it did on federal grounds requires us to reach the merits." !d., at--.
This ad hoc method of dealing with cases that involve possible adequate and independent state grounds is antithetical
to the doctrinal consistency that is required when sensitive
issues of federal-state relations are involved. Moreover,
none of the various methods of disposition that we have employed thus far recommends itself as the preferred method
that we should apply to the exclusion of others, and we therefore determine that it is appropriate to reexamine our treatment of this jurisdictional issue in order to achieve the consistency that is necessary.
The process that we have employed in cases such as Delaware v. Prouse is unsatisfactory because it requires us to interpret state laws with which we are generally unfamiliar,
and which often, as in this case, have not been discussed at
length by the parties. Vacation and continuance for clarification have also been unsatisfactory both because of the delay and decrease in efficiency of judicial administration, see
Dixon v. Duffy, 344 U. S. 143 (1952), 5 and, more important,
because these methods of disposition place significant burdens on state courts to demonstrate the presence or absence
of our jurisdiction. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Indeed, Dixon v. Duffy is also illustrative of another difficulty involved in our requiring state courts to reconsider their decisions for purposes of clarification. In Dixon, we continued the case on two occasions in
order to obtain clarification, but none was forthcoming: "[T]he California
court advised petitioner's counsel informally that it doubted its jurisdiction
to render such a determination." 344 U. S., at 145. We then vacated the
judgment of the state court, and remanded.
5
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Jerome, 434 U. S. 241, 244 (1978) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting); Department of Motor Vehicles v. Rios, 410 U. S. 425,
427 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Finally, outright dismissal of cases is clearly not a panacea because it cannot be
doubted that there is an important need for uniformity in federal law, and that this need goes unsatisfied when we fail to
review an opinion that rests primarily upon federal grounds
and where the independence of an alleged state ground is not
apparent from the four corners of the opinion. We have long
recognized that dismissal is inappropriate "where there is
strong indication ... that the federal constitution as judicially construed controlled the decision below." National
Tea Co., supra, 309 U. S., at 556 (1940).
Respect for the independence of state courts, as well as
avoidance of rendering advisory opinions, have been the cornerstones of this Court's refusal to decide cases where there
is an adequate and independent state ground. It is precisely
because of this respect for state courts, and this desire to
avoid advisory opinions, that we do not wish to continue to
decide issues of state law that go beyond the opinion that we
review, or to require state courts to reconsider cases to clarify the grounds of their decisions. Accordingly, when, as in
this case, a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law,
and when the adequacy and independence of any possible
state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we
will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state
court decided the case the way it did because it believed that
federal law required it to do so. If a state court chooses
merely to rely on federal precedents as it would on the precedents of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear
by a plain statement in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only for the purpose of guidance,
and do not themselves compel the result that the court has
reached. In this way, both justice and judicial administration will be greatly improved. If the state court decision in-
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dicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on
bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds, we,
of course, will not undertake to review the decision.
This approach obviates in most instances the need to examine state law in order to decide the nature of the state court
decision, and will at the same time avoid the danger of our
rendering advisory opinions. 6 It also avoids the unsatisfactory and intrusive practice of requiring state courts to clarify
their decisions to the satisfaction of this Court. We believe
that such an approach will provide state judges with a clearer
opportunity to develop state jurisprudence unimpeded by
federal interference, and yet will preserve the integrity of
federal law. "It is fundamental that state courts be left free
and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions.
But it is equally important that ambiguous or obscure adjudications by state courts do not stand as barriers to a determination by this Court of the validity under the federal constitution of state action." National Tea Co., supra, 309
U. 8., at 557.
The principle that we will not review judgments of state
courts that rest on adequate and independent state grounds
is based, in part, on "the limitations of our own jurisdiction."
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117, 125 (1945). 7 The jurisdic6

There may be certain circumstances in which clarification is necessary
or desirable, and we will not be foreclosed from taking the appropriate
action.
7
In Herb v. Pitcairn, supra, the Court also wrote that it was desirable
that state courts "be asked rather than told what they have intended." It
is clear that we have already departed from that view in those cases in
which we have examined state law to determine whether a particular result was guided or compelled by federal law. Our decision today departs
further from Herb insofar as we disfavor further requests to state courts
for clarification, and we require a clear and express statement that a decision rests on adequate and independent state grounds. However, the
"plain statement" rule protects the integrity of state courts for the reasons
discussed above. The preference for clarification expressed in Herb has
failed to be a completely satisfactory means of protecting the state and fed-
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tional concern is that we not "render an avisory opinion, and
if the same judgment would be rendered by the state court
after we corrected its views of federal laws, our review could
amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion." I d., at
126. Our requirement of a "plain statement" that a decision
rests upon adequate and independent state grounds does not
in any way authorize the rendering of advisory opinions.
Rather, in determining, as we must, whether we have jurisdiction to review a case that is alleged to rest on adequate
and independent state grounds, see Abie State Bank v.
Bryan, supra, 282 U. 8., at 773, we merely assume that
there are no such grounds when it is not clear from the opinion itself that the state court relied upon an adequate and independent state ground and when it fairly appears that the
state court rested its decision primarily on federallaw. 8
Our review of the decision below under this framework
leaves us unconvinced that it rests upon an independent state
ground. Apart from its two citations to the state constitution, the court below relied exclusively on its understanding
of Terry and other federal cases. Not a single state case was
cited to support the state court's holding that the search of
the passenger compartment was unconstitutional. 9 Indeed,
era! interests that are involved.
8
It is not unusual for us to employ certain presumptions in deciding jurisdictional issues. For instance, although the petitioner bears the burden
of establishing our jurisdiction, Durley v. Mayo, 351 U. S. 277, 285 (1956),
we have held that the party who alleges that a controversy before us has
become moot has the "heavy burden" of establishing that we lack jurisdiction. County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U. S. 625, 631 (1979). That is,
we presume in those circumstances that we have jurisdiction until some
party establishes that we do not for reasons of mootness.
9
At oral argument, Long argued that the state court relied on its decision in People v. Reed, 393 Mich. 342, 224 N. W. 2d 867, cert. denied, 422
U. S. 1044 (1975). See Tr. of Oral Arg., at 29. However, the court cited
that case only in the context of a statement that the State did not seek to
justify the search in this case "by reference to other exceptions to the warrant requirement." 413 Mich., at 472, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869-870 (footnote

,l
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the court declared that the search in this case was unconstitutional because "[t]he Court of Appeals erroneously applied
the principles of Terry v. Ohio ... to the search of the interior of the vehicle in this case." 413 Mich., at 471, 320 N. W.
2d, at 869. The references to the state constitution in no
way indicate that the decision below rested on grounds in any
way independent from the state court's interpretation of federallaw. Even if we accept that the Michigan constitution
has been interpreted to provide independent protection for
certain rights also secured under the Fourth Amendment, it
fairly appears in this case that the Michigan Supreme Court
rested its decision primarily on federal law.
Rather than dismissing the case, or requiring that the
state court reconsider its decision on our behalf solely because of a mere possibility that an adequate and independent
ground supports the judgment, we find that we have jurisdiction in the absence of a plain statement that the decision
below rested on an adequate and independent state ground.
It appears to us that the state court "felt compelled by what
it understood to be federal constitutional considerations
to construe . . . its own law in the manner that it did."
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S.
562, 568 (1977). 10
omitted). The court then noted that Reed held that "A warrantless search
and seizure is unreasonable per se and violates the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and art. 1, § 11 of the state constitution unless shown to be within one of the exceptions to the rule." !d., at 472--473,
n. 8, 320 N. W. 2d, at 870, n. 8.
10
There is nothing unfair about requiring a plain statement of an independent state ground in this case. Even if we were to rest our decision on
an evaluation of the state law relevant to Long's claim, as we have sometimes done in the past, our understanding of Michigan law would also result
in our finding that we have jurisdiction to decide this case. Under state
search and seizure law, a "higher standard" is imposed under art. 1, § 11 of
the 1963 Michigan Constitution. See People v. Secrist, 413 Mich. 521, 525,
321 N. W. 2d 368, 369 (1982). If, however, the item seized is, inter alia, a
"narcotic drug . . . seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any
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III
The court below held, and respondent Long contends, that
Deputy Howell's entry into the vehicle cannot be justified
under the principles set forth in Terry because Terry authorized only a limited pat-down search of a person suspected of
criminal activity rather than a search of an area. 413 Mich.,
dwelling house in this state," art. 1, § 11 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution,
then the seizure is governed by a standard identical to that imposed by the
Fourth Amendment. See People v. Moore, 391 Mich. 426, 435, 216 N. W.
2d 770, 775 (1974).
Long argues that under the current Michigan Public Health Code
§ 333.7107, the definition of a "narcotic" does not include marijuana. The
difficulty with this argument is that Long fails to cite any authority for the
proposition that the term "narcotic" as used in the Michigan constitution is
dependent on current statutory definitions of that term. Indeed, it appears that just the opposite is true. The Michigan Supreme Court has
held that constitutional provisions are presumed "to be interpreted in accordance with existing laws and legal usages of the time" of the passage of
the provision. Bacon v. Kent-Ottawa Authority, 354 Mich. 159, 169, 92
N. W. 2d 492, 497 (1958). If the state legislature were able to change the
interpretation of a constitutional provision by statute, then the legislature
would have "the power of outright repeal of a duly-voted constitutional
provision." Ibid. Applying these principles, the Michigan courts have
held that a statute passed subsequent to the applicable state constitutional
provision is not relevant for interpreting its constitution, and that a definition in a legislative act pertains only to that act. Jones v. City of Ypsilanti, 26 Mich. App. 574, 182 N. W. 2d 795 (1970). See also Walber v.
Wayne Circuit Judge, 2 Mich. App. 145, 138 N. W. 2d 772 (1966), aff'd, 381
Mich. 138, 160 N. W. 2d 876 (1968). At the time that the 1963 Michigan
Constitution was enacted, it is clear that marijuana was considered a narcotic drug. See 1961 Mich. Pub. Acts, No. 266, § 1. Indeed, it appears
that marijuana was considered a narcotic drug in Michigan until1978, when
it was removed from the narcotic classification. We would conclude that
the seizure of marijuana in Michigan is not subject to analysis under any
"higher standard" that may be imposed on the seizure of other items. In
the light of our holding in Delaware v. Prouse, supra, that an interpretation of state law in our view compelled by federal constitutional considerations is not an independent state ground, we would have jurisdiction to
decide the case.
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at 472, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869 (footnote omitted). Brief for
Respondent, p. 10. Although Terry did involve the protective frisk of a person, we believe that the police action in this
case is justified by the principles that we have already established in Terry and other cases.
In Terry, the Court examined the validity of a "stop and
frisk" in the absence of probable cause and a warrant. The
police officer in Terry detained several suspects to ascertain
their identities after the officer had observed the suspects for
a brief period of time and formed the conclusion that they
were about to engage in criminal activity. Because the officer feared that the suspects were armed, he patted down
the outside of the suspects' clothing and discovered two
revolvers.
Examining the reasonableness of the officer's conduct in
Terry, 11 we held that there is '"no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or
seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails."' 392 U. S., at 21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U. S. 523, 536-537 (1967)). Although the conduct
of the officer in Terry involved a "severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security," 392 U. S., at 24-25,
Although we did not in any way weaken the warrant requirement, we
acknowledged that the typical "stop and frisk" situation involves "an entire
rubric of police conduct-necessarily swift action predicated upon the onthe-spot observations of the officer on the beat-which historically has not
been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure. Instead, the conduct in this case must be tested by the Fourth
Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures." 392 U. S., at 20 (footnote omitted). We have emphasized that
the propriety of a Terry stop and frisk is to be judged according to whether
the officer acted as a "reasonably prudent man" in deciding that the intrusion was justified. Terry, supra, 392 U. S., at 27. "A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most
reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time." Adams
v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 146 (1972).
11
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we found that the conduct was reasonable when we weighed
the interest of the individual against the legitimate interest
in "crime detection and prevention," id., at 23, and the "need
for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other
prospective victims of violence in situations where they lack
probable cause for an arrest." I d., at 24. When the officer
has a reasonable belief "that the individual whose suspicious
behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to
be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take
necessary measures to determine whether the person is in
fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm." Ibid.
Although Terry itself involved the stop and subsequent
pat-down search of a person, we were careful to note that
"[w]e need not develop at length in this case, however, the
limitations which the Fourth Amendment places upon a protective search and seizure for weapons. These limitations
will have to be developed in the concrete factual circumstances of individual cases." I d., at 29. Contrary to Long's
view, Terry did not restrict the preventative search to the
person of the detained suspect. 12
In two cases in which we applied Terry to specific factual
situations, we recognized that investigative detentions involving suspects in vehicles are especially fraught with danger to police officers. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434
U. S. 106 (1972), we held that police may order persons out of
As Chief Justice Coleman noted in her dissenting opinion in the
present case:
"The opinion in Terry authorized the frisking of an overcoat worn by
defendant because that was the issue presented by the facts. One could
reasonably conclude that a different result would not have been constitutionally required if the overcoat had been carried, folded over the forearm,
rather than worn. The constitutional principles in Terry would still
control."
413 Mich., at 475-476, 320 N. W. 2d, at 871 (Coleman, C. J., dissenting).
'

2
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an automobile during a stop for a traffic violation, and may
frisk those persons for weapons if there is a reasonable belief
that they are armed and dangerous. Our decision rested in
part on the "inordinate risk confronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in an automobile." I d., at 110. In
Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972), we held that the
police, acting on an informant's tip, may reach into the passenger compartment of an automobile to remove a gun from a
driver's waistband even where the gun was not apparent to
police from outside the car and the police knew of its existence only because of the tip. Again, our decision rested in
part on our view of the danger presented to police officers in
"traffic stop" and automobile situations. 13
Finally, we have also expressly recognized that suspects
may injure police officers and others by virtue of their access
to weapons, even though they may not themselves be armed.
In the Term following Terry, we decided Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969), which involved the limitations imposed on police authority to conduct a search incident to a
valid arrest. Relying explicitly on Terry, we held that when
an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to
search "the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control'-construing that phrase to mean the area from
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." I d., at 763. We reasoned that "[a]
gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested
can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed
in the clothing of the person arrested." Ibid. In New York
v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981), we determined that the lower
courts "have found no workable definition of 'the area within
3

"According to one study, approximately 30% of police shootings
occurred when a police officer approached a suspect seated in an automobile. Bristow, Police Officer Shootings-A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J.
Crim. L. C. & P. S. 93 (1963)." Adams v. Williams, supra, 407 U. S., at
148, n. 3 .
'

..

82-256-0PINION
MICHIGAN v. LONG

15

the immediate control of the arrestee' when that area arguably includes the interior of an automobile and the arrestee is
its recent occupant." I d., at 460. In order to provide a
"workable rule," ibid., we held that "articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an
automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably,
within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order
to grab a weapon' .... " Ibid. (quoting Chimel, supra, 395
U. S., at 763). We also held that the police may examine the
contents of any open or closed container found within the passenger compartment, "for if the passenger compartment is
within the reach of the arrestee, so will containers in it be
within his reach." 453 U. S., at 460. (footnote omitted).
See also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 702 (1981).
Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and
others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger, that roadside
encounters between police and suspects are especially hazardous, and that danger may arise from the possible presence
of weapons in the area surrounding a suspect. These principles compel our conclusion that the search of the passenger
compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in
which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the
police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on "specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the officers
to believe that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may
gain immediate control of weapons. 14 See Terry, 392 U. S.,
14
We stress that our decision does not mean that the police may conduct
automobile searches whenever they conduct an investigative stop , although
the "bright line" that we drew in Belton clearly authorizes such a search
whenever officers effect a custodial arrest. An additional interest exists
in the arrest context, i. e., preservation of evidence, and this justifies an
"automatic" search. However, that additional interest does not exist in
the Terry context. A Terry search, "unlike a search without a warrant
incident to a lawful arrest, is not justified by any need to prevent the disap-

,l
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at 21. "The issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in
the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his
safety or those of others was in danger." ld., at 27. If a
suspect is "dangerous," he is no less dangerous simply because he is not arrested. If, while conducting a legitimate
Terry search of the interior of the automobile, the officer
should, as here, discover contraband other than weapons, he
clearly cannot be required to ignore the contraband, and the
Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression in such
circumstances. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443,
465 (1971); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978);
Texas v. Brown,-- U.S.--,--,-- (1983) (plurality
opinion by REHNQUIST, J., and opinion concurring in the
judgment by POWELL, J.).
The circumstances of this case clearly justified Deputies
Howell and Lewis in their reasonable belief that Long posed
a danger if he were permitted to reenter his vehicle. The
hour was late and the area rural. Long was driving his automobile at excessive speed, ~nd his car swerved into a ditch.
The officers had to repeat their questions to Long, who appeared to be "under the influence" of some intoxicant. The
intrusion was "strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which
justifi[ed] its initiation." Terry, supra, 392 U. S., at 26.
Long was not frisked until the officers observed that there
was a large knife in the interior of the car into which Long
pearance or destruction of evidence of crime .. .. The sole justification of
the search ... is the protection of police officers and others nearby .. . ."
392 U. S., at 29. What we borrow now from Chimel and Belton is merely
the recognition that part of the reason to allow area searches incident to an
arrest is that the arrestee, who may not himself be armed, may be able to
gain access to weapons to injure officers or others nearby, or otherwise to
hinder legitimate police activity. This recognition applies as well in the
Terry context. However, because the interest in collecting and preserving evidence is not present in the Terry context, we require that officers
who conduct area searches during investigative detentions must do so only
when they have the level of suspicion identified in Terry.
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was about to reenter. The subsequent search of the car was
restricted to those areas to which Long would generally have
immediate control, and that could contain a weapon. The
trial court determined that the leather pouch containing marijuana could have contained a weapon. App. 64a. 15
In evaulating the validity of an officer's investigative or
protective conduct under Terry, the "[t]ouchstone of our
analysis ... is always 'the reasonableness in all circumstances of the particular government intrusion of a citizen's
personal security."' Pennsylvania v. Mimms, supra, 434
U. S., at 108-109 (quoting Terry, supra, 392 U. S., at 19).
In this case, the officers did not act unreasonably in taking
preventive measures to ensure that there were no other
weapons within Long's immediate grasp before permitting
him to reenter his automobile. Therefore, the balancing required by Terry clearly weighs in favor of allowing the police
to conduct an area search of the passenger compartment to
uncover weapons, as long as they possess an articulable and
objectively reasonable belief that the suspect is potentially
dangerous.
The Michigan Supreme Court appeared to believe that it
was not reasonable for the officers to believe that Long could
injure them, because he was effectively under their control
during the investigative stop and could not get access to any
weapons that might have been located in the automobile.
See 413 Mich., at 472, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869. This reasoning
is mistaken in several respects. During any investigative
detention, the suspect is "in the control" of the officers in the
sense that he "may be briefly detained against his will . . . ."
Terry, supra, 392 U. S., at 34 (WHITE, J., concurring). Just
as a Terry suspect on the street may, despite being under the
brief control of a police officer, reach into his clothing andretrieve a weapon, so might a Terry suspect in Long's position
15
Of course, our analysis would apply to justify the search of Long's person that was conducted by the officers after the discovery of the knife.

f
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break away from police control and retrieve a weapon from
his automobile. See United States v. Rainone, 586 F. 2d
1132, 1134 (CA71978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 980 (1979). In
addition, if the suspect is not placed under arrest, he will be
permitted to reenter his automobile, and he will then have access to any weapons inside. United States v. Powless, 546
F. 2d 792, 795-796 (CAS), cert. denied, 430 U. S. 910 (1977).
Or, as here, the suspect may be permitted to reenter the vehicle before the Terry investigation is over, and again, may
have access to weapons. In any event, we stress that a
Terry investigation, such as the one that occurred here, involves a police investigation "at close range," Terry, supra,
392 U. S., at 24, when the officer remains particularly vulnerable in part because a full custodial arrest has not been
effected, and the officer must make a "quick decision as to
how to protect himself and others from possible danger."
I d., at 28. In such circumstances, we have not required that
officers adopt alternate means to ensure their safety in order
to avoid the intrusion involved in a Terry encounter. 16
Long makes a number of arguments concerning the invalidity of the
search of the passenger compartment. The thrust of these arguments is
that Terry searches are limited in scope and that an area search is fundamentally inconsistent with this limited scope. We have recognized that
Terry searches are limited insofar as they may not be conducted in the absence of an articulable suspicion that the intrusion is justified, see e. g.,
Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 65 (1968), and that they are protective
in nature and limited to weapons, see Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85,
93-94 (1979). However, neither of these concerns is violated by our decision. To engage in an area search, which is limited to seeking weapons,
the officer must have an articulable suspicion that the suspect is potentially
dangerous.
Long also argues that there cannot be a legitimate Terry search based on
the discovery of the hunting knife because Long possessed that weapon le- .
gally. See Brief for Respondent, p. 17. Assuming arguendo that Long
possessed the knife lawfully, we have expressly rejected the view that the
validity of a Terry search depends on whether the weapon is possessed in
accordance with state law. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 146
'
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IV
The trial court and the court of appeals upheld the search
of the trunk as a valid inventory search under this Court's decision in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (1976).
The Michigan Supreme Court did not address this holding,
and instead suppressed the marijuana taken from the trunk
as a fruit of the illegal search of the interior of the automobile. Our holding that the initial search was justified under
Terry makes it necessary to determine whether the trunk
search was permissible under the Fourth Amendment.
However, we decline to address this question because it was
not passed upon by the Michigan Supreme Court, whose decision we review in this case. See Cardinale v. Louisiana,
394 U. S. 437, 438 (1969). We remand this issue to the court
below, to enable it to determine whether the trunk search
was permissible under Opperman, supra, or other decisions
of this Court. See, e. g., United States v. Ross,-- U. S.
- - , (1982). 17

v

The decision of the Michigan Supreme Court is reversed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

(1972).
17
Long suggests that the trunk search is invalid under state law. See
Tr. of Oral Arg., at 41, 43--44. The Michigan Supreme Court is, of course,
free to determine the validity of that search under state law.
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